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WAR IS GOVERNANCE:
EXPLAINING THE LOGIC OF THE LAWS OF WAR
FROM A PRINCIPAL–AGENT PERSPECTIVE
Eyal Benvenisti*
Amichai Cohen**
What is the purpose of the international law on armed conflict, and why
would opponents bent on destroying each other’s capabilities commit to and
obey rules designed to limit their choice of targets, weapons, and tactics? Tra-
ditionally, answers to this question have been offered on the one hand by
moralists who regard the law as being inspired by morality and on the other
by realists who explain this branch of law on the basis of reciprocity. Neither
side’s answers withstand close scrutiny. In this Article, we develop an alterna-
tive explanation that is based on the principal–agent model of domestic gov-
ernance. We pry open the black box of “the state” and examine the complex
interaction between the civilian and military apparatuses seething beneath the
veil of sovereignty. Our point of departure is that military conflicts raise sig-
nificant intrastate conflicts of interest that result from the delegation of au-
thority to engage in combat: between civil society and elected officials, between
elected officials and military commanders, and within the military chain of
command. We submit that the most effective way to reduce domestic agency
costs prevalent in war is by relying on external resources to monitor and disci-
pline the agents. Even though it may be costly, and reciprocity is not assured,
principals who worry that agency slack may harm them or their nation’s in-
terests are likely to prefer that international norms regulate warfare. The Arti-
cle expounds the theory and uses it to explain the evolution of the law and its
specific doctrines, and it outlines the normative implications of this new un-
derstanding of the purpose of the law. Ultimately, our analysis suggests that as
a practical matter, international law enhances the ability of states to amass
huge armies because it lowers the costs of controlling them. Therefore, al-
though at times compliance with the law may prove costly in the short run, in
the long run states with massive armies are its greatest beneficiaries.
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Introduction
Intuitively, the laws of international armed conflict (hereinafter “IHL”)
are meant to regulate interstate action. As such, their very existence is puz-
zling: Why would opponents bent on destroying each other’s capabilities
commit to and obey rules designed to limit their choice of targets, weapons,
and tactics?
Traditionally, two kinds of answers have been provided to this question.
On the one hand, moralists regard IHL as being inspired by morality.1 On
the other, realists explain the evolution of the law on utilitarian grounds and
view compliance with it as a product of the threat of reciprocal retaliation.2
We contend that both answers address only part of the dynamics of warfare
and are therefore only partially convincing. Morality was obviously an im-
portant factor in the promotion of IHL, especially by nonstate actors. But it
is difficult to reconcile morality with a law that strictly relies on state con-
sent and is based on state practice, often reflecting not the aspiration to
strive for just war during battle but rather the primacy of military necessity.3
Nor can morality explain the codification process of IHL, which was domi-
nated by military experts and governmental officials keen on promoting na-
tional interests.4
1. The question of the morality of the laws of war is most intimately connected with the
“just war” theory, see Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars 127–33 (4th ed. 2006), and
Larry May, War Crimes and Just War 3–8 (2007). On the moral approaches to law, see
Gabriella Blum, The Laws of War and the “Lesser Evil”, 35 Yale J. Int’l L. 1, 39 (2010) (“From
a deontological stance, the actions proscribed by strict IHL rules . . . are inherently repugnant,
a violation of a moral imperative in the Kantian sense, independent of any cost-benefit calcu-
lation in any particular instance.”).
2. Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Economic Foundations of International Law
190–95 (2013) (suggesting that laws of war are possible in the first place and would be
respected only under conditions of symmetry (namely, when the rules give advantage to
neither side) and reciprocity (namely, the ability of the opponent to retaliate for prior viola-
tions)); Eric A. Posner, Human Rights, the Laws of War, and Reciprocity, 6 L. & Ethics Hum.
Rts. 147, 150, 170–71 (2012); Eric A. Posner, Centennial Tribute Essay, A Theory of the Laws of
War, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 297, 297 (2003).
3. Until very recently, and some argue even now, morality was subject to military neces-
sity. On this tension between morality and international legal doctrine, see David Luban, Mili-
tary Necessity and the Cultures of Military Law, 26 Leiden J. Int’l L. 315, 315–17 (2013), and
discussion infra Section I.D.
4. In his speech at the Hague Peace Conference of 1899, Fedor Martens observed that
“[t]hose who have caused the idea of humanity to progress in the practice of war are not so
much the philanthropists and publicists as the great captains . . . who have seen war with their
own eyes.” 1899 Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences 506 (James Brown Scott
ed., Div. of Int’l Law, Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1920)
(1907) [hereinafter Proceedings], available at https://archive.org/stream/proceedingshagu02
scotgoog#page/n8/mode/2up; see also Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare 147 (1980)
(“The law of war could not be developed at all without the assent of the generals and the
admirals, and these were years . . . when their power and influence were very great.”). Profes-
sor Best describes the Hague Peace Conferences as “conferences supposedly about peace, but
much more obviously concerned with war.” Id. at 140; see also Percy Bordwell, The Law of
War Between Belligerents 112 (1908) (“[I]t is fortunate that the [Brussels Declaration of
1874] was so largely the work of military men.”). The military also initiated the Instructions
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The prevailing “retaliatory” explanation of IHL makes more intuitive
sense at first blush. The tit-for-tat scenario can be modeled as an indefinitely
iterated prisoner’s dilemma and illustrated by real-life examples, such as the
trench warfare of World War I5 or specific stories concerning the treatment
of prisoners of war (“POWs”) during the two World Wars.6 But this expla-
nation, too, does not withstand close scrutiny as the main explanation for
IHL’s continued efficacy. To be effective, reciprocity requires that each side
have ample information confirming the opponent’s intention and ability to
comply with the law indefinitely. This condition is rarely met during com-
bat. The noise of the battlefield typically induces adversaries to interpret
their enemy’s mistakes as intentional violations of the law and prompts
them to retaliate in kind. More seriously, the shadow of the future is often
quite narrow. For combatants actually involved in combat, each battle may
well be their last; for their commanders, it may be crucial to eventual vic-
tory. This is especially true during the closing phase of a war: the losing side,
with its back to the wall, cannot be expected to obey laws that guarantee its
defeat; and the winning side, on the cusp of victory, is unlikely to worry
about reprisals for its own breaches of the law.7 With such an anticipated
endgame, cooperation based on an iterated prisoner’s dilemma situation
will quickly unravel.
Moreover, the retaliatory tit-for-tat explanation misses many aspects of
the dynamics of war that reflect coordination games such as chicken or bat-
tle of the sexes rather than prisoner’s dilemma. The prisoner’s dilemma
story cannot explain the codification process of IHL during the second half
of the nineteenth century, which was characterized by pressure emanating
from the stronger European nations to clarify the law, in particular the law of
occupation.8 As in the classic battle of the sexes game, the weaker countries
were far less eager to accept a law that would benefit their more powerful
for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field [hereinafter the Lieber Code],
published on April 24, 1863. See John Fabian Witt, Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in
American History 193 (2012). For further criticism of the moralist explanation, see Posner
& Sykes, supra note 2, at 191–92.
5. See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation 82–85 (1984) (explaining
how a powerful ethic of revenge was evoked when mandatory raids on enemy trenches caused
mutual cooperation to deteriorate).
6. One famous example began when British commandos tied up numerous German
soldiers for the duration of an operation after the commandos surprised the soldiers. Alfred
M. de Zayas, The Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau, 1939–1945, at 108 (Univ. of Neb. Press
1989) (1979). “In retaliation, Hitler ordered that all British prisoners of war in Germany . . . be
. . . tied up,” upon which “the British government ordered German prisoners of war to be
shackled.” Id.; see also 1 Alexander Gillespie, A History of the Laws of War 146, 173
(2011) (detailing other instances of reciprocal violations of the laws of war).
7. Obviously, if there are no incentives to comply with IHL during the last round of
fighting, the indefinitely iterated game will unravel at earlier stages, leading both sides to disre-
gard the law. See Avinash K. Dixit & Barry J. Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically 100
(1991).
8. See Eyal Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation 45–46 (2d ed.
2012).
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enemies, but they preferred some law that would constrain any future in-
vader or occupier rather than no law.9 As this Article will explain, other
wartime situations reflect the chicken game, where some parties have a dom-
inant preference to abide by IHL regardless of their opponent’s choice.10 In
these scenarios, IHL serves as an effective tool to promote parties’ self-inter-
est. In the Article, we argue that this self-interest, which is independent of
the opponent’s attitude toward compliance, is what explains the evolution
and nature of IHL. This self-interest was met by the weaker states’ gratitude
for being granted some protection against evil rather than no protection.
While we do not reject the two traditional explanations for IHL as addi-
tional layers of explanation for some IHL rules and for the observance of
IHL in some armed conflicts, we think that neither of them can account for
the drive to codify, modify, and further develop IHL since the mid-nine-
teenth century, nor can they explain its continued viability. We submit that
these two explanations fail to grasp a crucial factor in the dynamics of mod-
ern warfare: the need for each side to control its own forces. The leaderships
of contending armies may indeed be motivated by moral concerns or locked
in a reciprocal relationship, but this is not why they rely on IHL; for this
they need no formal law, just as the princes and kings in earlier times could
rely on their shared understandings about the law. Modern militaries and
their civilian leaderships need IHL—indeed, a kind of IHL that is specifically
tailored to control the agents—because they collectively face a daunting
challenge of controlling their respective troops, whose interests may diverge
from their own. During war each decisionmaker has a different future to
consider: the state’s president will have a long-term vision, contemplating
the transition to peace, while the army commander will focus more con-
cretely on the grand picture of the war. But the foot soldier at the service of
them both has a rather concrete future to consider—how to be effective and
survive the current assault on enemy positions. The need for law to maintain
discipline within the fighting forces rises in direct relation to the growing
disparity between the different “futures” that shape each actor’s preferences.
In the Article, we explain why a codified, specifically designed IHL is
necessary for resolving hierarchical governance challenges more than hori-
zontal relations between armies. We believe that this intricate internal di-
mension of warfare, which traditional accounts of IHL largely miss and
scholars of international law often disregard, provides an important key to
9. Indeed, it was the latter group’s reluctance that delayed the adoption of a compre-
hensive treaty on IHL between 1874 and 1899. See id. at 39–41, 45–46. Note that the law on
occupation violates Posner and Sykes’s symmetry condition, see id.; Posner & Sykes, supra
note 2, yet it was endorsed because the parties to the convention were engaged in a battle of
the sexes game rather than in a prisoner’s dilemma. Similarly, the symmetry condition cannot
explain initiatives of the more powerful armies to ban harmful weapons or types of ammuni-
tion that they alone possessed, such as the exploding bullets banned in 1868. See infra note 79
and accompanying text.
10. See infra Part IV, on asymmetric warfare.
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an understanding of IHL’s development and resilience since the mid-nine-
teenth century. This Article looks beyond the veil of sovereignty and exam-
ines the interplay between the various domestic actors whose interests are
implicated by war. Our rationale is informed by the observation that states
engaged in armed conflict are not unitary actors but rather complex institu-
tions that include internal chains of command within the echelons of power,
accountable to a civilian government and ultimately to the public.
To explain this counterintuitive hypothesis, we must begin by prying
open the black box of “the state” and examining the complex interaction
between the civilian and military apparatuses seething beneath the veil of
sovereignty.11 Such an examination will reveal that the prevalent assumption
that IHL is designed only to regulate interstate relations is too simplistic.
The map of the battlefield may show one state fighting another, but there are
other less visible and more complex intrastate battles raging simultaneously
between different domestic actors, each seeking to control the conduct of the
army and shape the war’s outcome. As scholars of political science have long
observed, controlling the armed forces, especially during war, is one of the
most acute challenges for any government. In democracies, one of the “most
basic of political questions” is how “to . . . reconcile a military strong
enough to do anything the civilians ask, with a military subordinate enough
to do only what civilians authorize.”12 This question leads to the following:
[A]n ineluctable and potentially dangerous tension between military force
and constitutional government [which] makes for a vexing dilemma. Al-
though raising and deploying armed forces may be indispensable for sus-
taining a secure environment for constitutionalist politics, creating a safe
place . . . for military institutions [is] among the most troublesome chal-
lenges of a constitutionalist order.13
There is conflict not only between the high command of the armed forces
and the civilian government that seeks to control it. Resorting to force cre-
ates conflicts between civil society and elected officials, between elected offi-
cials and military commanders, and between those commanders and combat
11. This is true not only in the IHL context. Like any complex organization, states pro-
mote policies preferred by those domestic actors who are more politically effective than their
competitors. Hence, theories that are based on the assumption that somehow “the state” can
have unitary preferences risk being unrealistic. Compare Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the
Age of Globalization, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 167 (1999) (focusing on the influence of interest groups
on the shaping of international norms), with Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The
Limits of International Law 4–5, 7 (2005) (“[W]e give the state the starring role in our
drama. . . . Our theory of international law assumes that states act rationally to maximize their
interests.”), and Andrew T. Guzman, How International Law Works 121 (2008) (“Our
basic rational choice assumptions imply that states will only enter into agreements when doing
so makes them (or, at least, their policymakers) better off.”).
12. Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Re-
lations 1–2 (2003).
13. Mark E. Brandon, War and the American Constitutional Order, in The Constitution
in Wartime 11, 13 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005).
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soldiers. IHL is an external tool designed to address many of these internal
conflicts.
These diverse conflicts can all be framed as principal–agent (“P–A”)
conflicts, situations in which each “principal” (the public, elected officials,
high command) necessarily employs an “agent” (elected officials, high com-
mand, combat soldiers, respectively) to further its goals and secure its inter-
ests. The delegation of authority to engage in combat exposes the principal
to the risk that the agent might act in its own interest rather than in that of
its principal.14 Agency costs tend to be high during wartime.15 The principals
want to win the war, but they are also aware that it will be necessary to
reestablish peace afterward. The principals therefore fear that their agents
might act too aggressively, undermining the principals’ long-term goals.
Conversely, the military may have similar concerns when it is the civilian
government that weighs only short-term interests at the expense of long-
term ones, while soldiers are primarily concerned about their own survival
during each engagement. Agency slack is high due to the opportunities for
the agents to shirk their duties with impunity during combat.
The principal can employ several measures to reduce such agency costs
by, for example, monitoring the agent or imposing penalties for violations.
But incomplete information limits the high command’s ability to control
low-ranking combatants. The civilian government suffers not only from in-
complete information but also from inadequate expertise to assess it and a
limited ability to restrain the military, if necessary.16 When we carefully ob-
serve the multilevel dynamics of the battlefield, we notice that societies and
commanders invest considerable effort in managing the delicate interface
within the echelons of military power. Soldiers should be motivated to risk
their lives when fighting the enemy but to maintain discipline at the same
time.17 Soldiers determined to confront the enemy yet fearing for their lives
might be tempted to protect themselves at the cost of unnecessary harm to
14. In this context, the military is no different from any other bureaucracy that may be
framed as an agent of political principals. See generally Kenneth A. Shepsle & Mark S.
Bonchek, Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions 360–70 (1997)
(discussing how bureaucratic policies drift toward an agency’s ideal); Mathew D. McCubbins
et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political
Control of Agencies, 75 Va. L. Rev. 431, 433–35 (1989) (discussing problems in limiting the
discretion of agencies).
15. See Feaver, supra note 12, at 4, 68; Brandon, supra note 13, at 20–21, 22.
16. One famous example is Israel’s first Lebanon War in 1982, during the course of
which the Israeli prime minister was surprised to learn from an American envoy that the Israel
Defense Forces (“IDF”) had just invaded Beirut. It turned out that the IDF chief of staff and
the minister of defense had decided to defy the prime minister’s clear orders. Shlomo
Nakdimon, Begin’s Legacy / ‘Yehiel, it ends today’, Haaretz (Feb. 22, 2012, 4:51 PM), http://
www.haaretz.com/weekend/magazine/begin-s-legacy-yehiel-it-ends-today-1.414173 (last vis-
ited Feb. 7, 2014).
17. In the trench warfare of World War I, soldiers on both sides tacitly cooperated to
lower their respective risks and defy their respective commanding officers who tried to force
them to fight. As Axelrod notes, “The soldiers became expert at defeating the monitoring
system.” Axelrod, supra note 5, at 81–82. In the post–World War II era, several Western
armies coached their soldiers to fear and hate the enemy, believing that portraying adversaries
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enemy combatants and civilians. Some military manuals reflect this concern
by suggesting that breaches of IHL “have almost invariably been shown to
have been the deeds of subordinates who have acted through ignorance or
excessive zeal; they have increasingly rarely been deliberate acts.”18 Similarly,
some manuals note that law is needed “to place a curb on the inflamed
passions of [the] . . . soldiers.”19 Empirical evidence collected from interna-
tional armed conflicts around the world between 1900 and 1991 cor-
roborates those statements. The data show that most violations are
perpetrated by low-ranking soldiers facing enemy combatants or foreign ci-
vilians.20 Indirectly, then, improving control of the military agent is the key
to reducing the risk of unnecessary harm to civilians and combatants.21
Small wonder that army commanders have been promulgating military
manuals to discipline their soldiers since well before the rules became legally
binding under international law. As Martens, the Russian architect of the
laws of war, notes: “The great captains . . . [b]eing obliged to place a curb on
the inflamed passions of their soldiers . . . inaugurated a discipline in their
armies, which was the source of the regulation of the usages of war.”22
Famously, Helmuth von Moltke, the chief of staff of the Prussian Army,
plays down the value of international law for the regulation of warfare, al-
though he emphasizes that internal law, as well as “religious and moral edu-
cation,” is the key to ensuring that “the gradual progress in morality [is]
reflected in the waging of war.”23
Not all armed forces, however, enjoyed the discipline of the Prussian
Army of 1880. Many of them soon discovered that during armed conflicts,
as evil and malicious created feelings that made killing easier. See Dave Grossman, On Kill-
ing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society 4, 9–15, 28–29
(1995); Richard Holmes, Acts of War: The Behavior of Men in Battle 365–75 (1986).
This approach sought to prevent the recurrence of the behavior of Allied soldiers during the
two World Wars, most of whom balked at firing at the enemy even when attacked. See Joanna
Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing: Face-To-Face Killing in Twentieth-Century
Warfare 61–62 (1999); Grossman, supra, at 4.
18. War Office, Manual of Military Law 244 (1914) (Gr. Brit.).
19. Proceedings, supra note 4, at 506.
20. James D. Morrow, When Do States Follow the Laws of War?, 101 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.
559, 571 (2007); see also James D. Morrow & Hyeran Jo, Compliance with the Laws of War:
Dataset and Coding Rules, 23 Conflict Mgmt. & Peace Sci. 91, 106–09 (2006) (concluding
that the treatment of civilians is the issue with the lowest level of compliance, whereas
the rules concerning chemical and biological weapons have the best record of compliance),
available at http://sitemaker.umich.edu/jdmorrow/data_sets.
21. Morrow, supra note 20, at 571; see also Morrow & Jo, supra note 20, at 106–09.
22. Proceedings, supra note 4, at 506.
23. Helmuth von Moltke, the Elder, On the Nature of War, in Die Zerstorung der
deutschen Politik: Dokumente 1871–1933, at 29–31 (Harry Pross ed., Richard S. Levy
trans., 1959) available at http://www.h-net.org/~german/gtext/kaiserreich/moltke.html (“I
wholly agree with the principle . . . that the gradual progress in morality must also be reflected
in the waging of war. But . . . [e]very law requires an authority to oversee and administer its
execution, and just this force is lacking for the observation of international agreements. What
third state would take up arms because one or both of two warring powers had violated the
law of war [loi de guerre]? An earthly judge is lacking. In this matter success is to be expected
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domestic mechanisms of control tend to fail. In this Article, we submit that
the most effective way for principals to overcome these constraints and se-
cure their interests, especially in times of war, is to outsource part of their
regulatory function to foreign and international actors, including even the
enemy. This outsourcing operates to rein in the agents by invoking shared
norms. Even though it may be costly and reciprocity is not assured, princi-
pals who are worried about agency slack that could prove disastrous to long-
term national interests are likely to prefer that international norms regulate
the military conflict. Hence, our basic argument is that IHL reflects domes-
tic principals’ attempts to create an effective means of monitoring and disci-
plining their agents.
Reliance on IHL and IHL-based institutions can reduce the agency costs
prevalent in war. IHL provides several benefits over purely domestic rules,
such as military manuals and domestic prescriptions. First, by committing
to international norms, domestic principals can tie their own hands in do-
mestic bargaining and thereby preempt domestic opposition, such as a polit-
ically powerful military. Second, IHL can overcome monitoring and
enforcement difficulties because the law can be interpreted and enforced by
actors other than national principals. If the military agent breaches IHL, the
victims (civilians and combatants on the enemy side), as well as neutral
third countries and actors, such as the International Committee of the Red
Cross (“ICRC”), can invoke the shared system of norms and bring the infor-
mation about violations to the attention of the principals.24 The principals
can then use this “fire alarm” mechanism to restrain their agents.25 Finally,
third-party enforcement can prove an effective and credible threat to agents
who might otherwise disregard their principals’ commands.
Hence, we hypothesize that ex ante demand for IHL (before actual fight-
ing) will be strong under the following cumulative conditions: (1) there is a
likelihood that the principals’ goals may differ from those of their military
agents; (2) the costs to the respective principals of unilaterally monitoring
their agents and enforcing compliance are relatively high; and (3) the agency
costs are likely to be offset by relying on information or enforcement pro-
vided by the opponent or by third parties using tools provided by interna-
tional law.26 The costs of externalizing the monitoring functions to the
only from the religious and moral education, the sense of honor and respect for law, of indi-
vidual leaders who make the law and act according to it, so far as this is generally possible to
do in the abnormal conditions of war.”).
24. Indeed, one of the ICRC’s major tasks is codifying and creating a shared interpreta-
tion of IHL, as evidenced in Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Addi-
tional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Yves
Sandoz et al. eds., 1987), as well as the restatement of customary law in Jean-Marie Henck-
aerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Customary Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law (2005).
25. See Mathew D. McCubbins et al., The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 15 J.L. Econ. & Org. 180, 198–99 (1999) (discussing the role of administrative law as
providing a fire alarm to the legislature when the executive deviates from its mandate).
26. Of course, there are significant costs involved in forming international law. Such
costs may be negligible when several principals share the agency problem.
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enemy (or to third parties, like the ICRC) could be substantial, and so the
principals will rely on IHL whenever they expect the P–A costs to be higher
than the costs of complying with IHL. If risk-averse principals anticipate
that those conditions will eventually materialize, they have a strong incentive
to invest in defining IHL.
At the same time, however, the principals will seek to retain sufficient
discretionary space to enable them to violate the law with impunity should
any of the three conditions not materialize during actual battle. Hence, the
norms they prefer will be “optimally imperfect,”27 namely, fairly detailed
primary norms coupled with escape clauses and weaker, more ambiguous
secondary norms that address the consequences for violation of the primary
norms.
Our analysis provides not only an explanation for the design of IHL but
also a hypothesis about the conditions under which principals would wish to
comply with the law or use its escape clauses. When principals do not need
third parties to control their agents (when there is no P–A conflict, when the
principal has alternative means of controlling its agents, or when the third
party becomes unreliable), the temptation to violate IHL will increase. This
does not necessarily suggest that the principal will then violate IHL. There
may still be good reasons to use IHL as a public relations tool to deflect
criticism, but then the principal will tend to interpret IHL in a self-serving
way rather than strictly impose it on its agents.
The same rationale can explain modern armies’ diminishing interest in
further developing IHL to address technological advancements and the chal-
lenges of asymmetric warfare. Technological improvements in recent de-
cades that enable modern armies to monitor their soldiers effectively, along
with growing dependence on reliable elite soldiers to operate sophisticated
weaponry and perform delicate tasks, reduce the threat of shirking. On the
other hand, the recourse to public shaming for IHL violations by civil soci-
ety NGOs, often seen by the principals as unreliable, reduces the latters’
appetite for international regulation of warfare.
In Part I, we elaborate on the three conditions mentioned above for the
emergence of IHL and present the full hypotheses of the Article. The three
subsequent Parts test the hypotheses: Part II outlines the evolution of IHL,
particularly during the second half of the nineteenth century; Part III exam-
ines specific rules and institutions and asks why (some) strong armies try to
comply with IHL during contemporary asymmetric conflicts; and Part IV
examines the role of IHL in governing asymmetric warfare against nonstate
actors. Part V then offers an initial exploration of the normative implica-
tions of the P–A rationale for IHL. We end the Article with a discussion of
our conclusions.
27. On the concept of optimally imperfect international norms that provide room for
decisionmakers and informed interest groups to escape the obligation to comply with those
norms, see George W. Downs & David M. Rocke, Optimal Imperfection? Domestic Un-
certainty and Institutions in International Relations 59–72 (1995).
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While in this Article we focus on the use of IHL to control military
agents, we suggest that other fields of international law serve the same pur-
pose. For example, the jus ad bellum of the nineteenth century, which re-
quired states to issue formal declaration of war before commencing
hostilities, can only be explained as the sovereign’s tool to control its mili-
tary agent. In our future work, we will address this and other uses of inter-
national law to resolve domestic control issues within the military.
I. A Principal–Agent Theory of IHL
The theory of the P–A relationship is well known and requires only
succinct reiteration: agency costs arise whenever one party to any social in-
teraction (the principal) delegates authority to another party to that interac-
tion (the agent) to act on the principal’s behalf, and the principal is unable
to ensure that the agent is acting in the principal’s best interest.28 There may
be several reasons why principals cannot control their agents effectively. The
agent may have more information about the issue at hand (such as in an
attorney–client relationship); the agent may be operating in a location where
the principal cannot monitor its actions; or the principal may be barred
from intervening in the agent’s actions or disciplining it by some external
constraint like a law or regulation. P–A relationships are also extant in gov-
ernmental activity at various levels: between the voters and elected officials,
between the legislature and the executive,29 between the executive and the
bureaucracy, and so forth.30 In all of these relationships, the principals worry
that various agents might defy the principals’ wishes and instead promote
their own.
Because of the armed forces’ unique character as perhaps the strongest
and most specialized of all bureaucracies, the political branches have even
28. For a general description of P–A theory, see Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
Fin. Econ. 305, 308–09 (1976); Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and
Agent Relationship, 10 Bell J. Econ. 55, 66 (1979); Eric Posner, Agency Models in Law and
Economics 1–3 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 92,
2000), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.204872.
29. Thomas H. Hammond & Jack H. Knott, Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: Presidential
Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of
Multi-Institutional Policy-Making, 12 J.L. Econ. & Org. 119, 163 (1996) (arguing that the
interactions between the president and Congress can create more or less autonomy for agen-
cies); Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Con-
trol, 3 J.L. Econ. & Org. 243, 249 (1987); Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic
Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission,
91 J. Pol. Econ. 765, 768 (1983); Barry R. Weingast, The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A
Principal Agent Perspective (with Applications to the SEC), 44 Pub. Choice 147, 155–57 (1984).
30. See, e.g., Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, The Federal Court System: A Principal-
Agent Perspective, 47 St. Louis U. L.J. 819, 820–22 (2003) (analyzing the federal courts system
as a P–A model).
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more reason to suspect that the military agent will deviate from the com-
mands it receives.31 Like any bureaucracy, the military agent seeks to main-
tain its discretion vis-a`-vis its principals. As Feaver puts it, “Regardless of
what the military agent is asked to do, he would like to do it with the mini-
mum of civilian interference and oversight.”32 The challenge of controlling
the military agent is particularly acute during armed conflicts, where the
traditional domestic modes of controlling agents are inadequate. This Part
outlines the theory for the function of IHL from a P–A perspective. It elabo-
rates on the three conditions that create the demand for IHL: (1) the poten-
tial conflict of interest between the principals and their agents; (2) the high
costs of unilateral monitoring and constraint of agents; and (3) the promise
of reliance on third parties, including enemies, when invoking IHL. This
Part concludes with an assessment of the relationships between the different
motivations for IHL: morality, reciprocity, and governance.
A. A Potential Conflict of Interest Between Principals and Agents
During Warfare
War gives rise to clashes between the divergent interests and goals of the
relevant actors—civil society, the political branches (hereinafter referred to
collectively as “government,” although obviously there are also internal ten-
sions within the legislative and executive branches), and the army (and, of
course, tensions throughout the army’s echelons).33
There may be several sources of such clashes: the government may have
longer-term or broader concerns than the army, which is focused on win-
ning the battle at minimal expense in terms of personnel and equipment.
The government may be interested, for example, in its future relations with
foreign civilians whom it will govern when the fighting is over or in its long-
term relations with other governments, while the army may play down such
concerns. By contrast, governments—particularly democratic governments
that may fear losing the forthcoming elections—might adopt short-term
goals, whereas the army, which is a repeat player in different arenas, might
wish to maintain its own reputation in anticipation of future conflicts. There
may also be clashes between the high command of the army and the lower
ranks: in the past, both governments and armies have shown little respect
31. Some political scientists have used the P–A framework to analyze civil–military rela-
tions. See, e.g., Deborah D. Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Les-
sons from Peripheral Wars (1994); Risa A. Brooks, Shaping Strategy: The Civil
Military Politics of Strategic Assessment (2008). Feaver has produced the major work in
this field. See Feaver, supra note 12. In law, there have been almost no attempts to use the P–A
paradigm to analyze civil–military relations. One exception is Ziv Bohrer’s work in which he
examines the defense of superior-order doctrine in criminal law from the perspective of P–A
relations. As he demonstrates, the inherent conflict of interest between the principals and the
army manifests itself in several types of situations that call for a set of responses. Ziv Bohrer,
The Superior Orders Defense: A Principal-Agent Analysis, 41 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 1 (2012).
32. Feaver, supra note 12, at 64.
33. Id. at 57.
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for their own soldiers, exposing them to unnecessary risks,34 while soldiers
have sought ways to reduce their own exposure to risk in battle at the ex-
pense of the other side’s civilians and soldiers, thereby potentially harming
their own national interests. All of these are potential sources of conflicts of
interest between principals and agents.
Conflicts can also arise due to different assessments of the consequences
of certain strategies.35 For example, during both World Wars, the conduct of
submarine warfare proved a bone of contention among the German govern-
ment, foreign office, and navy. The government was concerned about the
United States’ possible entry into the war, whereas the navy played down
this worry and pressed for indiscriminate attacks on British merchant
ships.36 Below we describe in general terms the features of the most common
conflict of interest—that between the elected government as the principal
and the armed forces as the agent. We describe other more specific P–A
conflicts later in this Article.
Not all states and armies face the same P–A problems. Much depends
on the relative strength of the army and its prospective role in future battles.
Generally, we can expect higher agency costs to be associated with stronger
armies, which may be expected to invade foreign territories and engage for-
eign populations. As Martens observes, “[D]iscipline was all the more neces-
sary in case of invasion of a hostile territory.”37
By contrast, relatively weaker armed forces are not expected to invade
other countries; conflicts of interest with their principals over the manage-
ment of foreign occupied territories are therefore less likely, limiting the
effectiveness of foreign civilians as a fire alarm.38 Moreover, in the case of a
weaker state fighting for its survival, the interests of the government and the
army become equally short-termed and thus aligned. This leads to the
counterintuitive hypothesis—tested and proved below—that states with
stronger armies have a greater interest in IHL and are more committed to
complying with it, whereas states with weaker armies evince less interest in
IHL and display less commitment to its observance.39
When states are engaged in life-or-death battles, seeking “victory by all
means” in a “total war,” as was the case during several stages of World War
II, the goals of the principals and their agents become aligned. Their mutual
34. Among the notable examples are the Napoleonic wars, see Charles Esdaile, Napo-
leon’s Wars: An International History, 1803–1815, at 472–85 (2007), and the trench
warfare of World War I, see Adam Hochschild, To End All Wars: A Story of Loyalty and
Rebellion, 1914–1918 (2011).
35. Armed forces are known to inflate the extent of national security threats. See Feaver,
supra note 12, at 63; see also Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the
Cuban Missile Crisis (1971).
36. D.P. O’Connell, The Influence of Law on Sea Power 45–49 (1975).
37. Proceedings, supra note 4, at 506.
38. Until recently, weaker armies could perhaps engage in battle with enemy combatants
but could not harm the enemy’s civilians in the rear.
39. IHL itself is a result of a battle of the sexes game of draftsmanship: the weaker states
opt for some law rather than none. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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interests should lead to a limited demand for norms regulating the P–A
relationship. Such an alignment of interests may explain the pervasive disre-
gard of IHL during the greater portion of the two World Wars.40 For this
reason, as we argue below,41 state executives seek optimally imperfect norms
that enable them to dodge the law with impunity when they deem it
necessary.
B. Inadequate Domestic Mechanisms for Controlling the Agents
Most cases of P–A problems are resolved through legal and institutional
tools that provide information to the principal or enable it to punish the
agent. Such mechanisms are problematic in the context of warfare. The in-
formation asymmetry between principals and agents within the military
during the military conflict is acute, as commanders ordinarily rely on their
subordinates to learn about the battlefield picture. This asymmetry is even
more acute for the civilian leadership (and for their own principals, the vot-
ers), which, besides lacking information, has a limited capacity to interpret
and assess the military situation. In addition to the information gap, it is
difficult to elicit and enforce compliance from a recalcitrant army.
Theoretically, principals can try to overcome these two problems by re-
lying on three domestic mechanisms, which we term here “the market re-
sponse,” “the bureaucratic response,” and “the domestic law response.” The
market response relies on the gathering and dissemination of information by
private actors—such as the news media, civil society activists, or even the
victims themselves—who upload their smartphone pictures to the in-
ternet.42 The freedoms of speech and of the media usually yield at least some
information to constrain the army.43 Granted, to the extent that these actors
have the means to monitor the army and report on its activities, the market
response may serve as an effective fire alarm by providing timely and reliable
information to the uninformed government (for example, the information
40. See 1 Gillespie, supra note 6, at 169 (chronicling the widespread killing of prisoners
in World War I); James Owen, Nuremberg: Evil on Trial 55 (2006); M.W. Royse, Aerial
Bombardment and the International Regulation of Warfare 131–32 (1928) (explain-
ing how a weapon’s restriction will be inversely proportional to its effectiveness); Chris af
Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War,
35 Harv. Int’l L.J. 49, 80–82 (1994) (explaining how nations permitted indiscriminate bomb-
ing of civilians during World War I).
41. See infra text accompanying note 65.
42. Feaver thinks that “[t]he most prominent fire alarm on defense policy is the news
media,” but he acknowledges the weakness of the media, noting that it is silent during war so
as not to play into the hands of the enemy. Feaver, supra note 12, at 80, 83.
43. See Yoram Peri, The Media and the Military: From Collusion to Collision, in Demo-
cratic Societies and Their Armed Forces: Israel in Comparative Context 184, 190–93
(Stuart A. Cohen ed., 2000) (claiming that the Israeli media has moved from cooperating with
the government to criticizing it).
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about Abu Ghraib).44 But the combatants can easily restrict media access,
and the information provided may be of low quality or distorted by the lack
of clear markers distinguishing between lawful and unlawful action. The me-
dia provides useful fire alarms only in egregious cases. Most importantly,
media coverage has only an ex post effect—when it is already too late—
whereas principals seeking to control their military agents require a set of ex
ante restraints. Lastly, as Feaver notes, governments dread media reports
that expose their own shortcomings and inability to tame the army, and
hence they prefer to obtain private information about their agents’ perform-
ance,45 which is exactly the kind of information the ICRC provides.46
Alternatively, the bureaucratic response may consist of setting up com-
peting military agencies that have a vested interest in checking and balancing
each other. In Feaver’s study of the relationship between civilians and the
armed forces in the United States, he describes the various bureaucratic ways
in which the civilian principal controls its military agents by dividing the
structure of the U.S. armed forces, which creates interagency rivalries that
give civilians more control.47 An informal bureaucratic response can be
found in Israel, a country where army generals retire relatively early to go
into political life, and, as a result, the army is almost always overseen by
civilian leaders with a strong military background.48 The weaknesses of this
response are the potential collusion of the various agents49 or the opposite
worry that the different agents may hobble each other and undermine the
collective effort.50 Lastly, while bureaucratic responses may be efficient in
reducing the gaps between the government and the army, they do not neces-
sarily mitigate the agency costs incurred by the citizens.
Finally, the domestic law response consists of domestic statutes and mil-
itary codes (“military manuals”). These codes regulate the behavior of the
agents, impose checks on them, and otherwise enforce compliance with the
44. Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, The New Yorker, May 10, 2004, at 42,
available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/05/10/040510fa_fact (last visited Feb. 7,
2014).
45. Feaver, supra note 12, at 83.
46. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
47. Feaver, supra note 12, at 81.
48. On this phenomenon and its effects, see Moshe Lissak, Paradoxes of Israeli Civil-
Military Relations: An Introduction, in Israeli Society and its Defense Establishment 1,
1–12 (Moshe Lissak ed., 1984), and Yoram Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the
Military Shapes Israeli Policy (2006).
49. Especially when the head of the executive has no military background, as happened
in the case of the IDF’s invasion of Beirut. See Esti Ahronovitz, Begin’s Legacy / The man who
transformed Israel, Haaretz (Feb. 22, 2012, 5:08 PM) http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/maga-
zine/begin-s-legacy-the-man-who-transformed-israel-1.414180 (last visited Feb. 7, 2014);
Nakdimon, supra note 16.
50. On “inter-service rivalry,” see, for example, Frank Ledwidge, Punching Below
Our Weight: How Inter-Service Rivalry Has Damaged the British Armed Forces
(Yale Univ. Press e-book, 2012).
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principal’s goals through domestic legal institutions (such as courts and dis-
ciplinary tribunals), which expound and enforce such obligations.51 In the
context of armed conflicts, this response suffers from serious deficiencies
relative to norms that are based on international law. First, experience sug-
gests—as evidenced most recently in the aftermath of 9/11—that in times of
actual or perceived threat, domestic measures fail to accomplish their antici-
pated functions.52 Second, domestic norms are not shared across nations,
and therefore victims and third parties may not be aware of them, which
limits their opportunities to invoke them against the agent. By contrast, uni-
versal norms and global institutions are more accessible to victims and third
parties and are therefore more likely to trigger their responses. Third, do-
mestic law does not impose similar constraints on the enemy. Other things
being equal, even powerful armies would prefer universal restraints that also
burden their opponents to unilateral ones. Fourth, recourse to international
law may be preferable to state executives because they enjoy a greater degree
of freedom from their respective legislatures when they represent their state
in international bargaining over the contents of the law.53 They can more
effectively tie their own (and their military’s) hands through an interna-
tional treaty, which cannot be repealed unilaterally.54 Moreover, interna-
tional treaties leave room for discretion where the executive deems fit.55 In
vibrant democracies whose political branches have different preferences, or
when majorities are cyclical or unstable, the ability to converge on norms to
51. The first known military manuals date to the Salian Dynasty in the fifth century AD.
William Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 17–18 (2d ed. 1920). By the early
twentieth century, many European powers had manuals addressing military tactics and behav-
ior in battle. See infra note 103 and accompanying text. An early example of such a statute is
the Mutiny Act of 1689, which protected the British Parliament from the king. See Norman
Davies, The Isles: A History 730 (1999).
52. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency 183 (2009) (“The President’s
control over the military and intelligence agencies, his ability to act in secret, and his power to
self-interpret legal limits on his authority create extraordinary opportunities for abuse. Presi-
dents throughout American history have used the threat of war or emergency to expand presi-
dential powers in ways that later seemed unrelated or unnecessary to the crisis.”); see also Jack
L. Goldsmith, Power and Constraint 3–18 (2012) (describing how U.S. presidential power
was enhanced dramatically, and possibly unconstitutionally, in the post–9/11 phase).
53. Benvenisti, supra note 11, at 185–86; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Agencies on the Loose?
Holding Government Networks Accountable, in Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation:
Legal Problems and Political Prospects 521 (George A. Bermann et. al. eds., 2000);
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Government Networks: The Heart of the Liberal Democratic Order, in
Democratic Governance and International Law 199, 218 (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R.
Roth eds., 2000); see also Amichai Cohen, Terrorism-Related Adjudication, in Rethinking the
Law of Armed Conflict in an Age of Terrorism 167 (Christopher A. Ford & Amichai
Cohen eds., 2012) (domestic norms empower domestic enforcement institutions (courts, com-
missions of inquiry), which might narrow the executive’s discretion beyond a level that it
deems optimal).
54. Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in
Postwar Europe, 54 Int’l Org. 217 (2000); Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Polit-
ics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 Int’l Org. 427 (1988).
55. Downs & Rocke, supra note 27, at 130–32.
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control the state’s executive and military agents may be limited. The execu-
tive may then prevail by invoking authority based on international law.56
The domestic law response may also be problematic from the perspec-
tive of the military—the agent in this story. In wartime, this agent needs to
protect itself from the principal, who might expose the army to shortsighted,
uncalculated risks. IHL, which constrains the army, shields it at the same
time from more aggressive policies that the civilian government might be
tempted to pursue. This factor is particularly important in contemporary
asymmetric warfare against nonstate actors, for reasons elaborated in Part
IV below.
Obviously, IHL norms cannot check all the possibilities for agency drift
by the military and therefore do not mitigate all agency costs involved in the
specific P–A relationship between the government and armed forces. But the
main rules constraining the military during armed conflict and occupation
pertain to areas where agency drift typically occurs. The rules are designed
to curb the temptation to use force beyond what is necessary and thereby
alienate the enemy’s civilian population or even induce neutral third parties
to assist the enemy. Moreover, information about IHL violations can be a
good proxy for identifying pervasive disciplinary problems within the mili-
tary command structure and may prompt the government to react. These
factors offer tools for principals that can prove more effective than any alter-
natives for controlling their agents.
C. IHL as an Optimal Response to Principal–Agent Problems
Thus far, we have argued that for governments as principals, the costs of
creating domestic control mechanisms over their agents are high: the private
market cannot be relied upon; bureaucratic mechanisms may break down
under the stress of law; and domestic legal institutions may not be as effec-
tive as international ones. IHL, in contrast, can at times be an effective—in
fact, the most effective—tool for parties in a military conflict to mitigate the
costs associated with the P–A problems identified above. We explain the
effectiveness of IHL as a tool for reducing agency costs from the perspective
of the different principals along the chain of command and also discuss why
the same norms can benefit agents vis-a`-vis their principals. Domestic actors
often use international law to stabilize their relationships and remove areas
of regulation from domestic contestation.57 The international regulation of
56. John Fabian Witt describes an early example where Alexander Hamilton invoked IHL
as a source of federal authority over the member states of the union. See John Fabian Witt, The
Dismal History of the Laws of War, 1 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 895, 905–06 (2011).
57. Examples include regional human rights regimes, such as the European Convention
on Human Rights, see Moravcsik, supra note 54, and international trade agreements, such as
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, see Robert O. Keohane et al., Democracy-Enhanc-
ing Multilateralism, 63 Int’l Org. 1, 9–13 (2009) (claiming that “[m]ultilateral institutions
such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), WTO, and North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provide mechanisms by which democratic publics can limit the
influence of minority factions by committing in advance to a set of multilateral rules and
practices that reflect broad public interests”).
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armed conflict is yet another example of this practice, perhaps the most
counterintuitive of them all.
To principals, the use of international norms offers three advantages:
first, it provides an effective and reliable system of fire alarms by sufficiently
informed actors (victims and third parties); second, it allows the principal to
direct a credible threat against the agent, in the form of an international
norm whose enforcement is outsourced to foreign actors; and third, it en-
ables the principal, who is worried about the breakdown of discipline during
battle and the mounting pressure to seek short-term goals, to tie its own
hands in advance.
1. Third Parties as Fire Alarms
The use of third parties as fire alarms is an effective solution to the
information asymmetry between the principal and agent. The victims of
IHL violations are, by definition, the actors best informed to report on vio-
lations committed against them. Naturally, the victims may not always be
trusted, as they have an interest in exaggerating their damages. But victims
also have an interest in providing accurate information about violations be-
cause baseless accusations will deprive them of credibility. Moreover, even
false alarms may be preferable to none, as they require the military to pro-
vide information that otherwise would have remained secret in order to
counter the accusation.58 More important are neutral states and interna-
tional organizations like the ICRC, which can credibly monitor compliance
and inform the principal of violations committed by its agents during mili-
tary operations. Because IHL rules are universal, an actor can make refer-
ence to them regardless of the actor’s nationality. And because many of the
IHL rules are clear, at least at their core,59 they provide information that
persons who possess no military expertise, and little legal expertise, can as-
sess—for the complaint to be communicated from the victim to the princi-
pal, it is sufficient that the complainant believes that the law was violated,
regardless of whether there was, in fact, a violation. This is why the noise of
war, which undermines reciprocity, does not diminish the value of fire
alarms: the question of intentionality, which is crucial to reciprocity, is less
58. For example, following accusations against Israel concerning its Operation Cast Lead
in Gaza (2008–2009), the IDF provided detailed information about its actions. See Gaza Op-
eration Investigations: An Update (2010) (Isr.), available at http://mfa.gov.il/MFA_Graph-
ics/MFA%20Gallery/Documents/GazaOperationInvestigationsUpdate.pdf (last visited Feb. 8,
2014).
59. See Amichai Cohen, Rules and Standards in the Application of International Humani-
tarian Law, 41 Isr. L. Rev. 41, 49 (2008) (“The Hague Regulations of 1907 include many such
legal norms that were drafted in a rule-like manner. They attempt to arrive at specific results,
and leave little to doubt. Thus, expropriation of property is allowed only for the needs of the
army of occupation; only soldiers who fulfill the four required conditions warrant POW status,
and the trumpeter of the messenger carrying a flag of truce possesses immunity. All these are
very specific ex ante agreements related to conduct during war. They are not hard to apply,
especially if one considers that there are almost no obligations beyond those written down in
the Hague Regulations.”).
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relevant to a principal interested in whether its army is following the rules in
practice.
The value of IHL as a fire alarm is reflected in its growing demand in
areas where the affected population or third parties can sound the alarm
bells for the principal to hear. If there were only a low likelihood that exter-
nal actors would react to violations, IHL would not be an effective alarm,
and the demand for it would decrease. Similarly, if information about what
transpired in the fighting zone were unlikely to reach the principals directly
or through third parties, this fire-alarm mechanism would be ineffective.
Hence, principals whose armies may occupy foreign territories, where the
local population is expected to react to violations and generate effective
alarms, will have a greater demand for IHL norms than principals whose
armies may only invade sparsely populated countries or regions where the
population is deemed unreliable or lacks effective means of invoking the law
as a reliable alarm.60 For similar reasons, demand will differ with respect to
different arenas of combat. IHL will be in high demand in land warfare
(other than in desert or arctic areas) because the victims and witnesses can
sound the alarm bells, but it will be in low demand in naval warfare, where
those who are affected have a low probability of survival and few witnesses
are likely to be found.
2. IHL as a Credible Threat Against Agents
International norms also provide for a credible threat by the principal
against the agent.61 Under the domestic law response outlined above, the
agent might discount the threat of sanctions against violators. Furthermore,
the principal might hesitate to prosecute its own combatants to avoid under-
mining morale and suffering associated political costs. But relying on third
parties who can invoke IHL resolves these potential problems. One such
third party could be the enemy, who is entitled to try POWs for war crimes
committed during the fighting.62 Another is the courts of third-party coun-
tries exercising universal jurisdiction—or international tribunals. The credi-
bility of the threat depends, of course, on the availability of such courts and
on the willingness of the respective prosecutors and those behind them actu-
ally to indict violators. The availability of such factors may, in turn,
60. Where the enemy was regarded as barbaric, information originating from the en-
emy’s side would have had little impact. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civili-
zations and the Remaking of World Order 168 (1996); John K. Fairbank, A Preliminary
Framework, in The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations 2–3
(John King Fairbank ed., 1968).
61. Feaver, supra note 12, at 89–94 (claiming that threats of punishment are an impor-
tant part of civilian control over the military).
62. For example, the British Manual of Military Law of 1914 mentions only this sanction
for violating the provisions of the manual. See War Office, supra note 18, at 302.
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strengthen the resolve of domestic institutions—courts, for example—to en-
force the law.63
There may be tensions, however, between the fire-alarm and credible-
threat functions of IHL. The fire-alarm mechanism is focused on providing
information to the principals but does not necessarily trigger enforcement
action by third parties.64 In this sense, the fire-alarm function of IHL is opti-
mal in its imperfect qualities65: for state executives, it is optimal to have ex
ante constraints on combatants who cannot predict whether their violations
will be prosecuted or ignored. Unable to predict their principal’s reaction to
their IHL violations, these combatants are likely to balance their aversion
toward assuming physical risk (which might prompt them to kill unnecessa-
rily) against their aversion to the risk of sanctions. The principals, however,
retain their discretion and may decide ultimately to forgo the sanctions
against their agents. The credible-threat mechanism is different in this sense.
The threat is credible because its exercise is in the hands of third parties who
are beyond the principal’s control. Hence, principals will opt for the credi-
ble-threat mechanism only if the fire-alarm function is not sufficiently effec-
tive to deter the agents and if deterring them is more important to the
principal than losing its discretion over enforcement action. Obviously, the
credible-threat function constrains the principals, too, and limits their abil-
ity to issue instructions to disobey IHL. This might prove too costly for
some principals.66 Such costs to principals associated with this credible-
threat mechanism explain the stunted development of international criminal
law over the years as compared with the significantly more elaborate devel-
opment of IHL.67
3. IHL as Legal Handcuffs
War is a time when desperate actors are tempted to break the law.
Whereas domestic law is relatively less resistant to pressures to modify it
through exercising emergency powers or judicial deference, IHL may prove
more resilient. For the same reason, IHL will also be useful to military and
civilian agents who are worried that principals may, at the height of battle,
63. Amichai Cohen, Domestic Courts and Sovereignty, in The Shifting Allocation of
Authority in International Law: Considering Sovereignty, Supremacy, and Sub-
sidiarity 265 (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds., 2008).
64. Not all IHL violations trigger enforceable legal consequences, and enforceable viola-
tions must find prosecutors willing to prosecute and courts willing to adjudicate.
65. See Downs & Rocke, supra note 27.
66. Interestingly, some armies have sought to overcome this tension by insisting that
obedience to superiors’ orders comes before obedience to the law and therefore that soldiers
should be immune from prosecution by the enemy if they “commit . . . violations of the
recognized rules of warfare as are ordered by their Government or by their commander.” War
Office, supra note 18, at 302.
67. For the conditions that led to the growing impact of international criminal law in
recent years, see infra note 227 and accompanying text.
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adopt shortsighted goals that deviate from the long-term national interest.68
IHL can therefore be seen as reflecting a pact between the civilian principals
and the military agents that politicians cannot change on a whim. Following
the same logic, IHL may constrain citizens who have lost their tempers and
demand harsh responses against a ruthless enemy. Here, IHL serves as an
outside constraint on civilian principals, which politicians and the army can
invoke to deflect criticism. This phenomenon is particularly relevant to con-
temporary conflicts involving nonstate actors.69
D. The Relationships Between Morality, Reciprocity, and Governance as
Motivations for IHL
The above analysis suggests that the demand for IHL by both principals
and agents does not necessarily depend on the attitude of the enemy or on
moral concerns. The principals may have an interest that is based on reci-
procity or morality, or they may have other motivations (for example, in-
voking IHL to portray their violent acts as lawful). The point, however, is
that without the challenges of governance presented during war, there would
be little demand for devising IHL in the first place. Similarly, there would be
little incentive to comply with IHL if not to protect oneself from governance
failures.
Considerations of morality and reciprocity, to the extent that they exist,
obviously could strengthen an actor’s commitment to comply with IHL.
Principals could more easily be able to convince their military agents to
comply with IHL if they could show that it was widely regarded as a legiti-
mate, shared body of norms. Soldiers might be convinced to comply with
IHL if told that morality so demands; commanders could be convinced to
respect IHL because this was what military ethics required. For that purpose,
it sufficed to show that other similarly situated militaries (even if not the
enemy) were committed to following the same rules. This likely motivated
the introduction of the so-called si-omnes (conditionality) clause in treaties
like the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions. That provision conditioned the
applicability of the IHL treaty on the mutual commitment to it by all the
parties engaged in the specific conflict.70 The clause was not crucial in a
68. On the tensions within the U.S. administration after 9/11 between the president who
sought more discretion and the military that insisted on adherence to IHL constraints, see
Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency, supra note 52; Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., A Tale of Two
Judges: A Judge Advocate’s Reflections on Judge Gonzales’s Apologia, 42 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 893
(2010); and David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guanta´namo, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1981,
2001 (2008).
69. See discussion infra Part IV.
70. Convention (IV) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 2, Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention], available at http://www.icrc.org/
applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=BEDFD1BDE5DB14CDC1
2563CD00516997; Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
art. 2, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803 [hereinafter 1899 Hague Convention], available at http://
www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=D619BD15
881DFC2FC12563CD00515C81.
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strictly legal sense because “the Rules basically codified principles that had
long been widely recognised”71 and hence were binding on all states as cus-
tomary international law.72 The Brussels Declaration of 1874, military
manuals of that period, and contemporaneous treatises on military law
completely ignored the requirement,73 as did the military practice that crys-
tallized between 1867 and 1874.74 We therefore think that the conditionality
clause was designed to appease agents who were worried about why they
should restrict themselves during battle.75
Finally, as the more specific discussion below will demonstrate, many
wartime dynamics do not reflect the prisoner’s dilemma game that raises
reciprocity concerns. In those more prevalent game situations, such as battle
of the sexes and chicken, IHL is required to ensure effective governance,
which is in the actor’s best interests.
II. Testing the Hypotheses: Tracing the Origins of Modern IHL
The above hypotheses can be tested through an analysis of the evolution
of the collective efforts to codify and develop IHL. In this Part, we explore
the timing of the rise of formal IHL, which we explain through the P–A
prism. While almost all societies have sought to regulate the conduct of war,
the emergence of a regime based on formal international law is a phenome-
non of modern times.76 The effort was designed not simply to codify the law
but to modify it to ensure effective control of agents. The origins of contem-
porary IHL related to land warfare can be traced to the second half of the
nineteenth century, in particular to the formative period of 1863–1874. It
was then that the modern law on armed conflict was defined, although its
formal codification had to wait until 1899. Following the introduction of the
so-called Lieber Code of 1863 to the Union Army,77 efforts to define interna-
tional rules for land warfare started with the first Geneva Convention of
71. Stephen C. Neff, War and the Law of Nations 187 (2005).
72. See Bordwell, supra note 4, at 112. See generally Winthrop, supra note 51, at 41–42
(referring to the unwritten military rules and principles of law).
73. See, e.g., Bordwell, supra note 4 (omitting any mention of the reciprocity or the si-
omnes clause); Winthrop, supra note 51 (also omitting mention of the si-omnes clause).
74. See Tomas Erskine Holland, A Lecture on the Brussels Conference of 1874,
at 8–9 (Oxford & London, James Parker & Co. 1876) (referring to the modus vivendi that was
accepted in Europe at the time of the Franco–Prussian War of 1870–1871).
75. Martens explained at the time that a solemn, mutual undertaking was necessary to
signify the existence of an international, or at least a European, society of states, which acts like
a “mutual insurance association against the abuses of force in time of war.” Proceedings,
supra note 4, at 518 (internal quotation marks omitted). On the reasons for the introduction
of the si-omnes condition in the Saint Petersburg Declaration of 1868, see infra note 126.
76. Of course, the conduct during warfare has been subject to unilateral and bilateral
norms since biblical times, but none had the form and contents of the law that developed since
the second half of the nineteenth century.
77. War Dept., Adjutant Gen. Office, General Orders No. 100: Instructions for
the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field (1863) [hereinafter
Lieber Code], available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp.
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1864 concerning the treatment of dead and wounded soldiers.78 Those ef-
forts continued with the Saint Petersburg Declaration of 1868, the first inter-
national undertaking to prohibit the use of a certain type of ammunition
(exploding bullets).79 That sort of rulemaking culminated in the 1874 Brus-
sels Declaration,80 the first comprehensive document outlining the rules of
occupation and of warfare on land.
Why was there this sudden burst of interest in the 1860s in regulating
warfare on land in a collective manner through international instruments?
What explains the formulation of elaborate rules concerning warfare on land
as opposed to the scanty treatment of naval warfare? Several explanations for
this development of the law have been offered, such as the demise of natural
law and the emergence of voluntary law81 or the realist explanation for the
rise of reciprocal relationships among military powers.82 All such explana-
tions are unable to account for the specific contents of the laws of war; they
can explain neither why these developments occurred at that historical junc-
ture, nor why the process found its expression in international rather than
domestic law (for example, military manuals for the respective armies).
By contrast, the P–A prism resolves both issues. This Part suggests that
it was only during the 1860s that international law became an effective tool
for regulating P–A relations. A more elaborate historical examination is be-
yond the scope of this Article, but we believe that the bird’s-eye view we
provide here is sufficiently robust to support our contention that the evolu-
tion of IHL in the mid-nineteenth century is a story of principals seeking
ways to enhance their control over their military agents and negotiating the
contours of the law not only with foreign governments but also with their
own armies and constituencies. Although we provide some proof below that
actors within certain states consciously followed this train of thought, our
theory does not require us to prove that the principals consciously sought
IHL as a means of controlling their agents. For our purposes, it is sufficient
to demonstrate that IHL suited their interest in controlling their respective
agents.83
78. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the
Field, Aug. 22, 1864, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter 1864 Geneva Convention],
available at http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?action=openDocument&docu-
mentId=477CEA122D7B7B3DC12563CD002D6603.
79. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400
Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297 [hereinafter St. Petersburg Declara-
tion], available at http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?action=openDocument&
documentId=3C02BAF088A50F61C12563CD002D663B.
80. Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War,
Aug. 27, 1874, 148 Consol. T.S. 133 [hereinafter Declaration of Brussels], available at http://
www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=42F78058BA
BF9C51C12563CD002D6659.
81. See Neff, supra note 71, at 167–69.
82. See sources cited supra note 2.
83. Cf. Gary S. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior 7 (1976)
(“[T]he economic approach does not assume that decisions units are necessarily conscious of
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Recall the three conditions for the efficacy of IHL: (1) a conflict of inter-
est between some principals and their agents; (2) the lack of effective alter-
natives to IHL for monitoring, assessing, and punishing the agent; and (3)
the availability to the principal of information or enforcement measures by
victims or third parties to close the agency gap. We argue that at this pivotal
moment in the 1860s, three domestic governance challenges intensified.
First, due to universal conscription, the army’s high command faced an in-
creasing need to discipline inexperienced soldiers. Second, the increasing
size of the armies made governments aware of the need to control them
more effectively, since chains of command had become longer, and larger
armed forces potentially posed a serious threat to existing regimes. Third,
citizens had become concerned about the way the government and the army
treated their sons-turned-soldiers. Public opinion—not necessarily seeking
world peace but certainly seeking more protection for the soldiers—had be-
come a force for elites to reckon with.84 These developments led to a com-
plex and multidimensional interplay between principals and agents: the
governments of powerful states and the armies’ high command all sought
ways to enhance their domination over their political and military agents.
Such governance challenges could not be overcome in this period solely by
traditional domestic mechanisms. At the same time, on the supply side, the
communication revolution provided the principals with external sources of
information from the battlefields and the occupied territories, sometimes
through third parties, which the principals could use to satisfy their growing
demand for restraints. In other words, it was only during the 1860s that
governments could begin to rely on international law as an alternative tool
for controlling their own militaries. The result was a turn to international
law to solve these governance problems and to empower specific domestic
actors in relation to others.
This Part will explore the three elements that prompted the evolution of
IHL. The final Section of this Part addresses a few exceptions that also prove
the rule: specific areas where international norms regulating hostilities did
not fully develop or were not observed. In these instances, either no conflicts
of interest emerged or third parties could offer neither fire alarms nor credi-
ble threats.
their efforts to maximize or can verbalize or otherwise describe . . . reasons for the systematic
patterns in their behavior.”).
84. Best summarizes the attitudes of key political leaders during the 1899 conference as
follows: “Even if the great powers were not able or willing to do anything concretely to reduce
the chances of armed conflict, their rulers felt it desirable to pretend otherwise.” Best, supra
note 4, at 140; see James Q. Whitman, The Verdict of Battle 235 (2012) (exploring the
transformation of warfare from “pitched battle[s]” controlled by monarchs to wars involving
republics that “degenerated into more chaotic violence”).
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A. An Intensifying Conflict of Interest Between Principals and Agents
From the inception of the sovereign state, civilian governments have
developed domestic mechanisms to control their armed forces and avert po-
tential threats to their authority. The move away from using small profes-
sional armies toward relying on large numbers of conscripts and on officers
not belonging to the aristocracy85 required an elaborate and effective disci-
plinary system.86 This became clear after the French Revolution, as both the
French National Assembly and army generals sought to regulate the army’s
use of force.87 The need for discipline in combat also intensified due to tech-
nological innovations that enabled swift maneuvers over great distances, in
which commanders could no longer maintain direct eye contact with all
their troops.88 As a result, the supreme command had to delegate decision-
making power to field commanders.89
85. Michael Howard, War in European History 107 (updated ed. 2009).
86. John Keegan, A History of Warfare 349–52 (1993). On the effect of mandatory
conscription on war in general, see id. at 359–66. In the Battle of Nordlingen (1634), one of
the major battles of the Thirty Years’ War in Europe, the Swedish-led coalition numbered
16,000 infantry plus 9,700 cavalry. The Spanish-led coalition numbered 20,000 infantry plus
13,000 cavalry. William P. Guthrie, Battles of the Thirty Years’ War 266, 268 (2002).
In the Battle of Borodino (1812), the major battle of Napoleon’s invasion of Russia, the French
forces numbered approximately 126,000, while the Russian forces numbered approximately
134,000. Adam Zamoyski, Moscow 1812: Napoleon’s Fatal March 258 (2004). More than
2.5 million soldiers participated in the seven-day Battle of the Marne (1914), in which the
French and British forces managed to halt the German invasion of France at the beginning of
World War I. Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to
Patton (1977). See also Oleg Airapetov, Miliutin Contra Moltke: Russia’s Refusal to Adopt a
Prussian-Style General Staff, in Reforming the Tsar’s Army: Military Innovation in Impe-
rial Russia from Peter the Great to the Revolution 292, 293–95 (David Schimmelpen-
ninck van der Oye & Bruce W. Menning eds., 2004) (arguing that after the French revolution,
armies over 100,000 became the rule among European powers, making their administration
more complicated, and also arguing that the Prussian Army’s success should be attributed to
its creating an effective general staff). See also Samuel E. Finer, State- and National-Building in
Europe: The Role of the Military, in The Formation of National States in Western Europe
84 (Charles Tilly ed., 1975).
87. In 1792, the French National Assembly declared that it would provide just and fair
treatment for prisoners. Pillaging was prohibited, and compensation was awarded for requisi-
tioned property. Best, supra note 4, at 78, 80 (1980); see also Wolfgang Kruse, Revolutionary
France and the Meanings of Leve´e en Masse, in War in an Age of Revolution, 1775–1815, at
299, 300 (Roger Chickering & Stig Fo¨rster eds., 2010).
88. Martin van Creveld, Command in War 104–09 (1985) (stressing that the greater
size of armies made command much more difficult and gave local units far more indepen-
dence). In this respect, the telegraph—although very important as a tool for mobilizing troops
and keeping senior commanders in touch with each other—made little difference. The tele-
graph operated only where there were lines—and that was not at the front, where in any case
they were easily cut and disrupted. Hence, “[t]he telegraph had an influence at the headquar-
ters level, but corps and divisions, not to mention formations further down the ladder, still
remained entirely dependent on messengers and optical and acoustic signals.” Id. at 108.
89. See Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership
in Wartime (2002) (describing how political leaders from Lincoln to Rumsfeld struggled with
the correct amount of delegation to their armed forces).
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In the mid-nineteenth century, European states moved toward universal
conscription.90 Once states introduced mandatory military service that cov-
ered all segments of society, producing a “citizens’ army” that encompassed
more than the poor peasantry,91 civil society became a significant political
actor with an interest in the way the military treated its “cheap supply” of
soldiers. Citizens became fearful that reckless executives would be all too
ready to sacrifice the lives of soldiers.92 Martens, a rising Russian interna-
tional jurist and the self-proclaimed initiator of the Brussels Conference of
1874, explains the sudden urge to convene the European powers: “[A]t the
very moment when obligatory military service is on the way of being intro-
duced here[,] the need to settle, in [international] law, the rights and duties
of troops has become an absolute imperative.”93
Not everyone was equally eager to confront this challenge. The British
government “was not convinced of the practical necessity” of a multilateral
convention on IHL and agreed to send a low-level military delegation to
Brussels only when it received assurances from all participants that naval
matters would not be discussed.94 Britain, which had not introduced the
draft, was engaged mainly in naval warfare and may have felt secure about
the efficacy of its internal democratic mechanisms for controlling its army.95
In contrast, Russia, with the largest standing army, enthusiastically pro-
moted IHL.96
B. The Need to Move Away from Unilateral Constraints
Initially, governments and armies relied on internal codes to discipline
their soldiers. President Lincoln issued the most famous military manual,
the so-called Lieber Code, on April 24, 1863,97 to resolve internal governance
problems that he and Henry Halleck, the general in chief, had identified.98
90. Howard, supra note 85, at 87; Jan Lucassen & Erik-Jan Zu¨rcher, Conscription and
Resistance: The Historical Context, 43 Int’l Rev. Soc. Hist. 405 (1998).
91. In France, an unequal system of conscription continued until the Franco–Prussian
War of 1870. Larry H. Addington, The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century
44, 98 (2d ed. 1994). Russia introduced universal conscription on the modern pattern in 1874.
Lucassen & Zu¨rcher, supra note 90, at 408. Both the Confederate Congress and the U.S. Con-
gress passed acts in 1862 requiring or authorizing universal conscription. Addington, supra,
at 68. Britain introduced conscription for the first time in 1916. Id. at 149.
92. See supra note 84. Best’s account of this period focuses on the dialectic between the
humanitarian sentiments of the peace movement and the nationalism and militarism of key
political and army figures. Best, supra note 4, at 128–47.
93. Karma Nabulsi, Traditions of War: Occupation, Resistance, and the Law 7
(1999).
94. Bordwell, supra note 4, at 102 (citing 1 Parl. Papers 28 (1874)).
95. See id. at 102, 104.
96. See Walter M. Pintner, The Burden of Defense in Imperial Russia, 1725–1914, 43 Russ.
Rev. 231 (1984).
97. Lieber Code, supra note 77.
98. The Code was not intended to ensure ethical fighting. It was actually criticized for
sanctioning excessively harmful practices. Jochnick & Normand, supra note 40, at 65–66. As
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The troops were by and large unprofessional, and there was a danger that
they might excessively harm and antagonize civilians.99 In addition, the gov-
ernance of the newly occupied Southern states proved quite problematic for
commanders untrained in civilian affairs.100 The Code addressed these con-
cerns by restricting participation in combat to those subject to the com-
manders’ control and discipline, defining the permitted conduct in warfare,
and providing authority and guidance for the effective governance of newly
captured localities. From the perspective of the executive and the military,
the Code promised one additional benefit: because it was a military code
based on the authority of international law, it restrained Congress from un-
desired intervention.101
Following the United States, several European nations adopted codes to
regulate their armies’ conduct during hostilities. Thomas Erskine Holland,
whom the British government entrusted in 1904 with the task of compiling a
“handbook” “for the information of H.M. land forces,”102 referred to “the
example set by the United States in 1863” and emphasized that those in-
structions were, “of course, authoritative only for the troops of the nation by
which they are issued, and differ considerably one from another.”103
Burrus Carnahan explains, from the U.S. War Department’s point of view, the Lieber Code
was primarily a response to the U.S. Army’s expansion during the Civil War. Burrus M. Carna-
han, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The Origins and Limits of the Principle of Military
Necessity, 92 Am. J. Int’l L. 213, 214 (1998). Witt argues that the Code was also designed to
legitimize the participation of freed slaves on the Union side and to protect them. Witt, supra
note 4, at 240–44.
99. Brigadier-General Davis states as follows:
The need of a positive code of instructions was severely felt during the early part of the
Civil War in the United States. During the first two years of that war the Federal Govern-
ment had succeeded in placing in the field armies of unexampled size, composed, in great
part, of men taken from civil pursuits, most of whom were unfamiliar with military
affairs, and so utterly unacquainted with the usages of war. . . . [Q]uestions of considera-
ble intricacy and difficulty were constantly arising . . . . Conflicting decisions and rulings
were of frequent occurrence in different armies, and at times in different parts of the
same field of operations; and great harm not infrequently resulted before these decisions
could be reversed by competent authority.
George B. Davis, The Elements of International Law 503 (3d ed. 1908); see also Witt,
supra note 56, at 905 (explaining how the influence of “the militia and . . . volunteer tradition
in U.S. history badly undercut the influence of professionals” in the occupation of Florida and
during the Mexican War).
100. Robert J. Futrell, Federal Military Government in the South, 1861–1865, 15 Mil. Aff.
181 (1951).
101. Futrell cites a letter from General Halleck to Lieber where Halleck expresses the fear
that Congress might circumscribe military power too narrowly. Id. at 187.
102. Holland explains that the British government, which “had long preferred in such
matters to ‘trust to the good sense of the British Officer,’ was at last induced to alter its policy”
and issue the handbook. Thomas Erskine Holland, The Laws of War on Land 2 n.*
(1908).
103. Id. at 2. In Appendix I, Holland mentions French, Italian, and German codes; the
confidential instructions to Prussian officers issued in 1870; and military manuals issued by
The Netherlands (1871), France (1877), Serbia (1878), Argentina (1881), Spain (1893), Ger-
many (1902), and Russia (1904). Id. at 71–73. Bordwell adds to the list the army regulations
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But such unilateral codes failed to address the citizens’ growing con-
cerns. It was during the closing years of the eighteenth century and the first
half of the nineteenth century that democracy began to take root on the
European continent. A variety of regimes provided more avenues for the
people to voice their concerns, even if they were not necessarily democratic
in the modern sense. This stronger interest coincided with a communication
revolution that had consequences no less dramatic than the “CNN effect” of
a century later. The inventions of the telegraph, the popular press, and the
railways “revolutionized the way Europeans . . . thought about war.”104 From
the Crimean War (1853–1856) onward,105 journalists brought home the
harsh realities of the battlefields of Europe, and the public reacted with fu-
ror. Governments lost their exclusive hold on information about battles and
casualties.106
As a result, citizens had both reason and opportunity to voice their
opinions on the use of the military. Henry Dunant was certainly not the first
civilian to witness atrocities. Yet in the mid-nineteenth century, he was able
to raise the awareness of a receptive civil society.107 Two other members of
the Geneva precursor of the Red Cross, Gustave Moynier and Louis Appia,
could in 1867 make the point that governments have a parental obligation to
take care of soldiers they conscript.108 This worry coincided with the intro-
duction of a universal draft in key European armies and the growing peace
movement in Europe that was opposed to wars and their harsh
consequences.109
It was not only mounting civil society pressure that prompted European
governments to explore more robust disciplinary measures beyond those
provided by internal army restrictions. In many countries, the military
posed a covert or overt threat of a coup d’e´tat and overthrow of the civilian
regime, especially if the regime embodied a weak form of democracy. This
threat materialized in several instances in Central and South America110 and
issued in Spain (1882), Italy (1896), Switzerland (1904), Portugal (undated), and Columbia
(undated). Bordwell, supra note 4, at 116. The protocols of the Brussels Projects (1874)
include references to the Austrian or Prussian military codes (session of 5 August) and the
Italian code (session of 22 August). Id.
104. John F. Hutchinson, Champions of Charity 26 (1996). On the growing effective-
ness between approximately 1860 and 1914 of the widely circulated cheap popular press as a
means of influencing and voicing public opinion, see Best, supra note 4, at 138.
105. See William Howard Russell, William Russell, Special Correspondent of
The Times (Roger Hudson ed., 1995).
106. Hutchinson, supra note 104, at 27.
107. Id. at 28.
108. See id. at 27–28 (citing G. Moynier & L. Appia, La Guerre et la Charite´ 31–32
(1867) (Switz.)).
109. Best, supra note 4, at 147; Barbara W. Tuchman, The Proud Tower: A Portrait
of the World Before the War, 1890–1914, reprinted in The Guns of August & The
Proud Tower 551, 832–34 (Margaret MacMillan ed., 2012).
110. Robert H. Holden, Armies Without Nations: Public Violence and State For-
mation in Central America, 1821–1960 (2004).
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was apparent in French politics throughout the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, as evidenced by the events surrounding the Boulanger
affair of 1889.111
Moreover, and more importantly, in the 1860s European powers started
to worry about their relations with foreign populations. With the rise of
nationalism in Europe, prospective occupiers were concerned about poten-
tially rebellious communities who would actively resist their rule, like the
Spanish guerrillas who fought Napoleon or the French francs-tireurs who
refused to end the war against the Prussians in 1870–1871.112 Such govern-
ments sought norms that would restrain their own soldiers in their interac-
tions with those civilians, thereby hopefully reducing civilian opposition.
For similar reasons, these governments worried that an unruly army’s ex-
cesses might “make[ ] . . . the return to peace unnecessarily difficult.”113
Governments were also concerned about neutral powers’ reaction to
military aggression. There is evidence suggesting that governments and their
military high commands sought to avoid causing any harm to neutral pow-
ers lest they join the enemy and to forestall complaints that neutrals might
raise.114 Finally, the wrath of global civil society—informed by the media
revolution of that time—was also something to be reckoned with. As the
British military manual of 1914 observes, “it is in the interest of a belligerent
to prevent his opponent having any justifiable occasion for complaint, be-
cause no Power, and especially no Power engaged in a national war, can
afford to be wholly regardless of the public opinion of the world.”115
111. William Irvine, The Boulanger Affair Reconsidered 73–124 (1989).
112. See Benvenisti, supra note 8, at 38–41 (discussing the background for developing
the law on occupation after the 1870–1871 war and noting that the smaller states of Europe
were unhappy with the text adopted in the 1874 Brussels Declaration concerning the authority
of the occupant and tried to resist it).
113. Lieber Code, supra note 77, art. 16. Article 16 of the Lieber Code captures the
longer-term concerns that motivate moderation during combat:
Military necessity does not admit of cruelty—that is, the infliction of suffering for the
sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or wounding except in fight, nor of
torture to extort confessions. . . . [I]n general, military necessity does not include any act
of hostility which makes the return to peace unnecessarily difficult.
Id.
114. Demonstrating the importance of keeping neutral states appeased, Prussia communi-
cated alleged French violations to neutral states during the Franco–Prussian War of
1870–1871. See War Office, supra note 18, at 301. In 1818, the King of Prussia captured this
concern most clearly in his instructions to his generals:
When war is carried on in a neutral country . . . the object of attention then is[ ] to rival
the enemy in the confidence and friendship of the inhabitants. To attain this end, the
most exact discipline must be observed, marauding and every kind of plunder strictly
forbidden, and it’s [sic] commission punished with exemplary severity.
Military Instructions from the Late King of Prussia to his Generals 66 (Foster trans.,
1818).
115. War Office, supra note 18, at 301.
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C. The Internationalization of Governance
By resorting to international law to reduce domestic agency costs, gov-
ernments obtained several benefits. As explained above, they were able to
rely on victims and observers to act as effective fire alarms that would relay
information about violations and might even independently prosecute viola-
tors.116 At the same time, governments could assuage public concerns and
demonstrate to their citizens and to foreign public opinion that they
respected the lives of their soldiers by conferring with potential enemies.
Moreover, IHL became a tool for bestowing legitimacy on practices that
many would potentially regard as repugnant.117 Specifically, the law of occu-
pation, which required the occupier to protect the authority and resources
of the ousted regime, functioned as a check against indigenous challenges to
that regime.118
Civil society activists such as Dunant and his colleagues also realized
that their best strategy was to seek clear universal norms that nonstate “in-
formants” could invoke against violators. The universal rules cut across po-
litical boundaries and empowered civil society activists vis-a`-vis their
respective governments. Their first victory was the Geneva Convention of
1864, which delineated the law on the treatment of the dead, wounded, and
POWs (without defining who was entitled to POW status).119 The conven-
tion did not impose onerous duties on governments or armies. Quite the
contrary: they were required merely to allow voluntary Red Cross associa-
tions access to the battlefield to treat wounded or captured soldiers and dis-
pose of the dead.120 The Prussian Army complied with the 1864 convention
as early as its war with Austria in 1866 and also provided treatment to en-
emy combatants without demanding reciprocity.121
The success of that convention led to further efforts to develop the law,
which included conferences in Paris (1867) and Geneva (1868).122 These ef-
forts, however, failed to produce binding texts.123 They were stunted by the
governments’ responses. In what may have been a reaction to the aroused
interest of civil society in regulating warfare, several European principals
met in 1868 in Saint Petersburg. The declaration they adopted loftily invokes
116. See supra Section I.C.1–2.
117. Jochnick & Normand, supra note 40, at 80–82.
118. Because the occupier had to maintain local laws and assume responsibility over gov-
ernment property, the Hague Regulations of 1907 constituted “a pact between state elites,
promising reciprocal guarantees of political continuity, and thus, at least to a certain extent,
rendering the decision to resort to arms less profound.” Benvenisti, supra note 8, at 70–71.
119. 1864 Geneva Convention, supra note 78.
120. Id.
121. Pierre Boissier, Henry Dunant, 14 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 395, 411–12 (1974); see
Hutchinson, supra note 104, at 74–75.
122. See Protocoles des Confe´rences tenues a` Gene`ve pour la re´vision de la Convention de
Gene`ve du 22 aouˆt 1864, Oct. 20, 1868, 20 Nouveau recueil ge´ne´ral de traite´s (ser. 3) 400;
Holland, supra note 74, at 8–9.
123. See Holland, supra note 74, at 8–9.
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the exalted goals shaped by “the progress of civilization” and stipulates that
what “[s]tates should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the
military forces of the enemy [and for that] purpose it is sufficient to disable
the greatest possible number of men” rather than “uselessly aggravate the
sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable.”124 No doubt,
the rhetoric was impressive and probably effective in disarming the grass-
roots opposition, even if the operative paragraph was quite limited and pro-
hibited the use of only one specific type of ammunition, which can be
loaded to foot soldiers’ rifles (the same ammunition could be used by the
artillery that was presumably under more reliable command).125 Govern-
ments’ main practical advantage from this agreement was better control of
their own armed forces’ use of ammunition.126 Painful and unnecessary
death was hard to justify at a time when reports from the bloody battlefields
awaiting young conscripts stirred up public opinion.
The 1874 Brussels Declaration—the product of yet another conference
that Russia initiated—can also be seen as a direct outcome of changing po-
litical realities resulting from universal conscription and governments’ grow-
ing attention to public opinion. One of Martens’s speeches reflected these
concerns, associating the “absolute imperative” to set rules based on interna-
tional law with the transition of many European powers to obligatory mili-
tary service.127
D. The Limits of IHL as a Mechanism of Governance
The explanation of IHL’s evolution during the second half of the nine-
teenth century as a result of growing P–A conflicts is further bolstered by
three counterexamples. They relate to the evolution of specific areas of war-
fare or neutrality: the stunted evolution of the law on naval warfare; the
strict rules that developed with respect to neutrality at sea; and the late ap-
pearance of the law on internal armed conflicts.
124. St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 79.
125. These bullets, which weighed less than 400 grams, exploded or ignited fire on impact
with human flesh and inflicted certain and painful death. Id.
126. The travaux of this declaration reveal that it sought to address a problem of govern-
ance within the respective armies rather than the need to regulate interstate relations: the
prohibited bullets were effective when used against ammunition boxes, but the governments
did not trust their soldiers simply to follow the orders that limited the use of these projectiles
to nonhuman targets. Protocols of the Military Conference at St. Petersburg, Oct. 28–Nov. 9
1868, 18 Nouveau recueil ge´ne´ral de traite´s (ser. 1) 458–64. (discussing the uncontrollable
temptation of foot soldiers to use such projectiles against human targets as the motivation for
the ban).
127. Nabulsi, supra note 93, at 7 (“[A]t the very moment when obligatory military ser-
vice is on the way to being introduced here the need to settle, in law, the rights and duties of
troops has become an absolute imperative.”); see also supra note 94 and accompanying text;
John Gooch, The Weary Titan: Strategy and Policy in Great Britain, 1890–1918, in The Making
of Strategy: Rules, States, and War 278, 285–87 (Williamson Murray et. al. eds., 1994).
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1. IHL and Naval Warfare
The laws of war discussed thus far relate to war on land. The story of the
laws of war at sea, with regard to both their evolution and content, is strik-
ingly different. This contrast raises a puzzle: if IHL is based on some notion
of morality, there should be little difference between the rules of each theater
of war. If IHL is based on reciprocity, we would also anticipate similar rules
to be applied on land and at sea. But that is not the case. Were it not for a
group of committed scholars who pieced together, as late as 1994, the San
Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea,128
it would have been difficult to locate a coherent set of norms concerning
naval warfare.129 Most conspicuously, the law on naval warfare never devel-
oped sufficiently to offer strong protection for civilians at sea. As J. Ashley
Roach points out, of the nine conventions adopted in The Hague in 1899
and 1907 concerning naval warfare, none addressed the question of which
vessels were immune from attack.130 During World War II, “enemy merchant
vessels were widely regarded as legitimate military targets subject to destruc-
tion on sight.”131 The process of overhauling IHL during the 1970s, which
culminated in the Additional Protocols of 1977, omitted sea warfare alto-
gether. Professor Ronzitti explains that the major powers had little interest
in such regulation.132 Consequently, “[c]urrent treaty law . . . does not
128. Int’l Inst. of Humanitarian Law, San Remo Manual on International Law
Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995), available at http:/
/www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/560?opendocument.
129. On the law of war at sea, see O’Connell, supra note 36; J. Ashley Roach, The Law of
Naval Warfare at the Turn of Two Centuries, 94 Am. J. Int’l L. 64 (2000); and Howard S. Levie,
Means and Methods of Combat at Sea, 14 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 727, 728–30 (1988),
arguing that the additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions does not apply to naval
warfare. Professor Lowe writes as follows:
There is, perhaps, no area of the public international law of war in such urgent need of
revision as the law of war at sea. In no other area is there such a complex set of “classical”
rules and so much uncertainty as to the extent to which those rules remain binding. Since
the outlawing of war and of the use of force, there has been a marked reluctance to use
the traditional terminology of the laws of war and neutrality. This has led to the aban-
donment in recent times of any clear conceptual framework, either in state practice or in
academic writing, for the analysis of the rights and duties regulating hostilities at sea.
Vaughan Lowe, Impact of the Law of the Sea on Naval Warfare, 14 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com.
657 (1988).
130. Roach, supra note 129, at 69. The only treaty adopted at the first Hague Peace Con-
ference of 1899 on naval warfare adapted to maritime warfare the principles of the 1864 Ge-
neva Convention concerning the treatment of the dead and wounded, see Convention Relative
to the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention of 22
August 1864, July 29, 1899 [hereinafter Hague Peace Conference], available at http://www.icrc.
org/ihl.nsf/FULL/155?OpenDocument.
131. Roach, supra note 129, at 70.
132. See Natalino Ronzitti, Naval Warfare, in 7 The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Pub-
lic International Law 557, 558, 566–67 (Ru¨diger Wolfrum ed., 2012).
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comprehensively identify which persons at sea should be entitled to pro-
tected status.”133
We submit that the only way to explain the different path taken with
respect to naval warfare is either the low P–A costs of controlling the navy or
the inability of IHL to reduce such costs. The P–A problem during fighting
at sea was not as acute as it was on land, the commanders of the navy vessels
effectively controlled sea warfare, and individual sailors had only limited
ability to deviate from orders and inflict harm unilaterally. Governments
were able to control the actions of their navy commanders by domestic
means, such as prize courts134 or criminal sanctions.135 Moreover, at sea, the
fire-alarm function of IHL would not work well since only a few survivors
were expected to return to report violations.
During the nineteenth century, IHL concerning naval warfare only de-
veloped in two areas: (1) where P–A conflicts could arise and the law was
easily enforceable; and (2) where civilian victims could serve as fire alarms.
The first norm abolished “privateering,” namely, authorizing private ships
to attack foreign shipping during wartime. During the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, private looting of enemy ships had been the norm.136
The British Navy, for example, had an elaborate system of dividing the loot
between private sailors and navy officers.137 This practice, which incentivized
private sailors to raid enemy ships, created agency slack, as the private actors
could abuse their mandate while seeking to increase their gains. Modern
fleets no longer needed private assistance and could unilaterally enforce the
prohibition. The practice was prohibited in the 1856 Paris Declaration Re-
specting Maritime Law.138
The other set of norms relates not to warfare at sea but to attacks against
targets on land, which affect civilians who could function as a fire alarm as
effectively as in the context of the law on land warfare. The law that devel-
oped restricted the use of the blockade.139 In 1907, another convention was
adopted relating to the protection of civilians on land from bombardment
from the sea.140
133. Roach, supra note 129, at 74.
134. C.D. Allin, English and German Prize Courts and Prize Law, 2 Minn. L. Rev. 22, 23
(1918).
135. The British Navy in the eighteenth century applied strict discipline by criminally
indicting any deviation from the manual listing the tactics to be used in sea warfare. Barbara
W. Tuchman, The First Salute 125 (1988).
136. Peter T. Bradley, British Maritime Enterprise in the New World: From the
Late Fifteenth to the Mid-Eighteenth Century 26–27 (1999).
137. Tuchman, supra note 135, at 114.
138. Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, 115 Consol. T.S. 1, available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/105?OpenDocument.
139. O’Connell, supra note 36, at 19–20.
140. Convention (IX) Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War art. 1,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2351, available at http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?ac-
tion=openDocument&documentId=F13F9FFC628FC33BC12563CD002D6819.
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2. The Law on Neutrality
Whereas the law concerning naval warfare is not very elaborate,141 the
opposite is true regarding the law on neutrality at sea. Carefully detailed
rules determine the rights of belligerents to visit neutral ports.142 This also
contrasts with the law on neutrality on land, which is not nearly as intri-
cate.143 This double contrast demonstrates the drafters’ preoccupation with
the challenge of governance, which is different at sea than on land.
Principals of all warring sides shared a strong interest in respecting the
interests of neutrals.144 Once the allocation of territorial jurisdictions in Eu-
rope stabilized, the laws on neutrality prohibited the use of a neutral terri-
tory by any of the belligerents.145 There was minimal likelihood that an army
would violate this prohibition on its own initiative. Hence, governments did
not require an elaborate code of neutrality on land.146 Neutrality at sea was
altogether a different matter, however. There, the worry was that military
vessels might inadvertently violate or be wrongly accused of having violated
a foreign state’s neutrality while visiting its ports.147 Vessels were expected to
be on their own at sea, and they were sometimes unable to communicate
with their principals. These principals left very little to the captains’ discre-
tion.148 Extraordinarily detailed rules regulated the entry of warships into,
their presence in, and their exit from neutral ports.149
141. See Convention (X) for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the
Geneva Convention, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2371, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/73cb
71d18dc4372741256739003e6372/e5397a0fb560d0a9c12563cd002d6832?OpenDocument.
142. See infra note 149; Convention (XIII) Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415, available at http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/
ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=06A47A50FE7412AFC12563CD002D6877&action=open
Document.
143. See Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, available at http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?action=open
Document&documentId=4D47F92DF3966A7EC12563CD002D6788.
144. See supra text accompanying note 114.
145. Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in
Case of War on Land art. 2, 5, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, available at http://www.icrc.org/
applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=71929FBD2655E558C125
63CD002D67AE.
146. See supra note 143.
147. See, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 36, at 18–19, 31–38.
148. E.g., id. at 42–43 (detailing a politically challenging situation in 1940, during which
Prime Minister Churchill himself drafted instructions for a naval captain).
149. Convention (XIII) Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval
War, supra note 142. These rules were carefully observed. In 1939, Germany was willing to
sacrifice the Graf Spee rather than flout Article 16 of that convention, which required the ship
to wait at the neutral port at least twenty-four hours after a British ship left the port. In the
meantime, the British battleships closed in on the German warship, waiting for it to leave the
port: according to another rule, the German vessel was not entitled to stay in a neutral port for
more than seventy-two hours. The German commander scuttled the ship to minimize casual-
ties among the troops. See O’Connell, supra note 36, at 27, 31–38.
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3. The Law on Internal Armed Conflict
Our explanation also serves to explain why the law on internal armed
conflicts remained underdeveloped until the second half of the twentieth
century. First, the P–A problem is less acute in the typical internal armed
conflict because there are only marginal differences between principals’ goals
and those of their respective militaries. Both actors view the enemy as illegit-
imate rebels whose forces should be crushed, perhaps by ruthless tactics
aimed at instilling awe and discouraging further opposition to the govern-
ment.150 The affected population is not regarded as a credible source of in-
formation (and any such information could only serve to tarnish the state’s
reputation abroad), and there is no external actor who could pose a credible
threat to the violators. The relatively recent developments in the law of inter-
nal armed conflicts were not motivated by the principals seeking to improve
their control of their agents. Rather, foreign actors have imposed these legal
developments on governments, mainly through norms enunciated by inter-
national criminal tribunals.151 In Part V below, we develop this issue in more
detail.
III. Specific Norms and Institutions
We have explained several principals’ motivations for using IHL to con-
strain their respective agents as well as how that function influenced the
development of IHL. In this Part, we explain how specific IHL norms and
institutions close the agency gap. The specific norms are designed to in-
crease discipline within the fighting force by restricting access to the battle-
field, to reduce the temptation of combatants to deviate from orders, and to
limit the ability of low-level soldiers to implicate the principals in strategic
blunders. The institutions generate information about violations and pro-
mote accountability within the military. Space limitations do not allow us to
examine each and every IHL norm or institution. We therefore focus on the
more salient of these norms.152
150. David A. Bell, The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of
Warfare as We Know It 156 (2007).
151. On the lawmaking functions of international criminal courts, see Allison Marston
Danner, When Courts Make Law: How the International Criminal Tribunals Recast the Laws of
War, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (2006), and Milan Kuhli and Klaus Gu¨nther, Judicial Lawmaking,
Discourse Theory, and the ICTY on Belligerent Reprisals, 12 German L.J. 1261 (2011), available
at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=1360.
152. On the defense of superior order in criminal law and IHL as a P–A device to sup-
press illegal orders, see Bohrer, supra note 31. A similar doctrine is command responsibility,
which reinforces the commanders’ obligation to maintain discipline among troops subject to
their control. On the doctrine of command responsibility, see Gue´nae¨l Mettraux, The Law
of Command Responsibility (2009).
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A. Norms
The prevailing view of IHL asserts that the law’s basic goals are distin-
guishing between combatants and noncombatants (exposing only combat-
ants to direct attack) and avoiding the infliction of unnecessary suffering on
combatants. But these two principles remained underdeveloped and lacked
specificity at least during the formative stages of the codification of IHL.153
In contrast, the norms that did receive close attention in the formative stages
of codification were only tangentially related to the basic goals. Instead, as
we argue in this Section, these norms sought to limit agency slack.
1. Regulating Access to the Battlefield: The Privilege to Participate
in Hostilities
The Lieber Code states that the protections of POW status apply only to
soldiers154 or “Partisans.”155 These protections are not afforded to “[m]en, or
squads of men, who commit hostilities, . . . without commission, without
being part and portion of the organized hostile army, and without sharing
continuously in the war.”156 The prevailing distinction between combatants
and noncombatants is commonly explained by the need to protect civilians:
if combatants fail to distinguish themselves from their civilian population,
the other party may be forced or tempted to target the civilian population
for fear that it is harboring soldiers.157
153. The targeting of civilians was not expressly forbidden before the Hague Peace Con-
ference of 1899 and was actually quite common. See 2 Alexander Gillespie, A History of
the Laws of War 14–16 (2011). Even after World War I, the British Air Ministry objected to
any legal actions against German pilots who used indiscriminate bombing during the war. Id.
at 20. Starving civilians as part of legitimate siege warfare was actually expressly allowed in the
Lieber Code and was not regarded as a war crime by the Nuremberg Tribunal, see the famous
United States v. von Leeb (High Command Case), in 10–11 Trials of War Criminals Before
the Nuernberg Military Tribunals (1951), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_
Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-X.pdf. See also Lieber Code, supra note 77, arts. 17, 18.
154. Lieber Code, supra note 77, art. 49.
155. “Partisans,” according to the Lieber Code, are “soldiers armed and wearing the uni-
form of their army, but belonging to a corps which acts detached from the main body for the
purpose of making inroads into the territory occupied by the enemy. If captured, they are
entitled to all the privileges of the prisoner of war.” Id. art. 81. During and after World War II,
privileged status was further restricted to include only those resistance fighters who are mem-
bers of a party to the conflict. Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, available at http://www.icrc.org/applic/
ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=77CB9983BE01D004C12563CD00
2D6B3E; see also Antonio Cassese, International Law 402 (2d ed. 2005).
156. Lieber Code, supra note 77, art. 82.
157. Article 44(3) of the first additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions states as
follows: “In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects of
hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while
they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack.” Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 44, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,
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This explanation is both logically flawed and historically inaccurate. It
would be strange to assume that the law was designed to force one party to
protect its own civilians; IHL was not designed to interfere with the way a
state treated its own population. Moreover, the rules requiring soldiers to
wear uniforms and subject themselves to the commands of a belligerent date
back to a relatively early stage in the evolution of IHL, when the protection
of civilians—as a matter of positive law—was still relatively weak.158 And
nonuniformed individuals were entitled to take up arms to confront advanc-
ing troops, even if they did not distinguish themselves from noncomba-
tants,159 which obviously endangered their civilians in situations where
civilians could easily find themselves in the line of fire. If not to protect
civilians, why, then, were soldiers required to be identifiable? Most likely, the
soldiers’ mark of privileged status—like the prohibition on “privateer-
ing”160—was aimed at preventing the participation in combat of irregular,
unruly fighters who could not properly be controlled by their commanders.
Men fighting without commission were not subject to the army’s chain of
command, “wildcards” more dangerous than they were useful. Lieber was
well aware of such dangers: at the start of the U.S. Civil War, the Confeder-
ates passed the Partisan Rangers Act (1862), which facilitated the involve-
ment of soldiers without uniform fighting behind Union lines. As it turned
out, however, those “partisan rangers” behaved like common criminals. In
one recorded incident, a group “entered the town of Lawrence, Kansas, and
available at http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?action=openDocument&docu-
mentId=D9E6B6264D7723C3C12563CD002D6CE4. The ICRC commentaries regarding this
article state the following:
[T]he ratio legis of this provision is given by the clause which states that it is “in order to
promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects of hostilities” that
combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves. Since the adversary is obliged at all
times to make a distinction between the civilian population and combatants, in order to
ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population (Article 48—Basic rule), such
a distinction must be made possible. If, for example, the invader is confronted during his
advance (the problem of occupation will be examined in the second sentence) by a com-
bined resistance of regular forces presenting identifiable military targets, and the harass-
ment of guerrilla forces which are indistinguishable from the civilian population, it is
more or less certain that the security of this population will end up by being seriously
threatened.
Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 24, at 527.
158. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
159. The leve´e en masse situation was described as follows:
The population of a territory which has not been occupied, who, on the approach of the
enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without having had time
to organize themselves in accordance with Article 9, shall be regarded as belligerents if
they respect the laws and customs of war.
See Declaration of Brussels, supra note 80, art. 10.
160. See supra text accompanying note 136.
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killed 150 men and boys in an act of senseless violence.”161 Jefferson Davis,
the president of the Confederacy, quickly repealed the law.162
We can therefore conclude that the restriction on participating in hostil-
ities was aimed at resolving a P–A problem rather than reducing harm to
civilians. The principal could not control combatants who were not subject
to its control and whom it could not even recognize because they were not
in uniform. The obligation to wear a uniform enforced this restriction by
exposing unauthorized fighters to the mercy of the enemy.
2. The Status of Prisoners of War
The law on POWs stipulates that those who possess combatant status
and have fallen into the hands of the enemy163 must be protected from vio-
lence and treated humanely at all times.164 Today this rule is generally under-
stood as designed to protect captured combatants from unnecessary
suffering. We identify a different motive, however. In analyzing the institu-
tion of POWs, it is necessary to differentiate between the status of POWs as
individuals who should be immune from harm once they have laid down
their arms (hors de combat) and the way POWs should be treated by the
detaining army (for example, where they should be detained and whether
they should be permitted to communicate with their families). The P–A
prism can explain why the regulation of these two issues developed sepa-
rately and why these issues were not similarly respected. As it happens,
whereas the norms concerning POW status developed early on and have
been generally well respected, the situation is quite different regarding the
treatment of POWs in custody.
The norms regarding the treatment of POWs took a long time to ma-
ture and were often abused.165 Resisted by governments throughout the
nineteenth century, they became part of the Geneva Law only in 1929, with
the adoption of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prison-
ers of War.166 In contrast, the law concerning the status of POWs as immune
from violence once they laid down their arms was recognized at the Brussels
Conference of 1874167 and codified in the Hague Regulations of 1899 and
1907.168 The norms regarding the status of POWs have been generally
respected in many, although certainly not all, conflicts.
161. 1 Gillespie, supra note 6, at 62.
162. Id.
163. Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 155.
164. Id., 6 U.S.T. at 3328, 75 U.N.T.S. at 146.
165. E.g., 1 Gillespie, supra note 6, at 149.
166. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat.
2021, 118 L.N.T.S. 343, available at http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?action=
openDocument&documentId=0BDEDDD046FDEBA9C12563CD002D69B1.
167. See Declaration of Brussels, supra note 80.
168. 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 70, at 2296, 2301–02 annex; 1899 Hague Con-
vention, supra note 70, at 1812, 1817 annex. For an economic study of this issue, see also
Bruno S. Frey & Heinz Buhofer, Prisoners and Property Rights, 31 J.L. & Econ. 19 (1988).
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We posit that the P–A analysis can account for the discrepancy between
the two types of norms concerning POWs. The definition of POW as a sta-
tus is designed to restrain the potential captor in the battlefield. In earlier
times, captors were free to negotiate ransom with their captives on pain of
death.169 This gave combatants the perverse incentive of seeking private gain
rather than following the commander’s orders. Such a tradeoff was both
unnecessary and problematic in an army of conscripts. When war became a
national enterprise, the need arose for a clear stipulation that all enemy
soldiers who surrendered would be kept alive and transferred to the central-
ized control of the state. These are the origins of rules on POW status. This
was reflected in the Paris conference in 1867, where the parties “agreed that
wounded soldiers needed protection against robbery and gratuitous injury
(for example, by looters).”170 Traces of this rationale also appear in the texts
that define POW status. Article 23 of the 1874 Brussels Declaration (as well
as Article 4 of the 1899 Hague Convention) emphasizes what is now self-
evident but was at the time an innovation:
[POWs] are in the power of the hostile Government, but not in that of the
individuals or corps who captured them.
. . . .
. . . All their personal belongings except arms shall remain their
property.171
The main interest of principals in establishing the institution of POWs
was to control their own soldiers during combat, lest they deviate from or-
ders and, instead of rushing forward, capture and ransom enemy combat-
ants. But once POWs were removed from the battlefield, the principals’
interest in regulating POW treatment waned. Indeed, the treatment of
POWs is one of the rare instances where the main incentive to comply with
the law is reciprocity (although tempting the enemy to surrender was an
effective incentive that could override reciprocity concerns). In fact, the
many failures to observe these norms, such as ordering POWs killed on the
battlefield or torturing them in captivity, may indicate that reciprocity on its
own, absent an additional P–A motivation, is often insufficient to ensure
compliance with IHL.
3. The Prohibition on Taking Booty
The same rationale that led to the creation of the POW regime—mini-
mizing private incentives in combat rather than reducing harm to the en-
emy—also explains the evolution of norms first regulating, and later
169. Like the concept of “privateering.” Bradley, supra note 136, at 26–27.
170. Hutchinson, supra note 104, at 80 (describing the informal agreement reached in
the 1867 Paris conference).
171. Declaration of Brussels, supra note 80, art. 23; see also Hague Peace Conference, supra
note 130, art. 4.
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prohibiting, pillaging.172 Several ancient traditions did not prohibit looting
but rather regarded it as a legitimate reward.173 Obviously, the loot provided
an incentive for fighters to join the fighting force and engage in combat with
determination. But it was also a potential source of conflict, both within the
fighting force and between soldier and principals, who wanted their share as
well. Therefore, complex rules had to be developed to provide effective in-
centives while minimizing tensions.
With the turn to a conscripts-based army, there was no longer a need to
provide private incentives to increase the force’s size. But with huge armies
now consisting of mostly poor and undisciplined soldiers, the regulation of
looting became a formidable task. Moreover, the reliance of the large army
on local resources grew dramatically. A large army of occupation was ex-
pected to feed its men and horses on the resources of the occupied popula-
tion and thus had to secure their continued availability. As a result, looting
and pillaging were strictly prohibited.174 More accurately, personal looting
was prohibited, whereas organized looting, otherwise known as the “requisi-
tioning” of private property, was recognized as lawful.175 As long as organ-
ized looting followed the rules, no P–A problems would arise.
4. The Prohibition on the Use of Certain Weapons and Types
of Ammunition
Intuitively, the prohibition on the use of certain weapons can have only
one goal: to prevent unnecessary suffering of combatants. But beyond moral
commands, to understand fully the armies’ incentives, attention should be
directed to the benefits accruing to armies from such prohibitions. The P–A
perspective suggests that weapons prohibitions provide a measure of control:
by prohibiting the use of weapons whose use may have adverse strategic
implications, armies seek to reduce the likelihood of strategic blunders cre-
ated by lower-ranking soldiers. In this Section, we discuss exploding bullets
and poison, two types of forbidden ammunition that gained recognition
early on under IHL.
172. Gillespie explains the evolution of strict norms in several ancient traditions as “nec-
essary for two reasons. First, so that equity could be achieved amongst the victors and each
would get their ‘just’ reward. . . . Secondly, so that the troops would continue to fight through
a conflict, and not stop to do private pillaging, allowing an enemy to regroup.” 2 Gillespie,
supra note 153, at 211.
173. As Napoleon advised his brother Joseph, when Joseph was made King of Naples, in
1806, “[t]he security of your dominion depends on how you behave in the conquered prov-
ince. Burn down a dozen places which are not willing to submit themselves. Of course, not
until you have first looted them; my soldiers must not be allowed to go away with their hands
empty.” Id. at 247.
174. 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 70, art. 28.
175. On the requisitioning of private property by the army of occupation, see infra notes
184–186 and accompanying text. Also, as part of the peace treaty, the losing side would pay
reparations to the victor. Most famously, under the Versailles treaty of 1919, Germany was to
pay reparations of 132 Billion Gold Marks. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy 257 (1995).
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The prohibition contained in the inaugural multilateral treaty on the
conduct of hostilities—the Saint Petersburg Declaration of 1868—related to
the use of bullets that explode or ignite fire on impact with human flesh,
causing certain and painful death and disfiguring the corpse.176 The declara-
tion resolved a problem of internal governance within the stronger Euro-
pean armies, which sought to limit foot soldiers’ access to this type of
ammunition. The prohibited bullets were quite effective when used against
nonhuman targets, such as cases of ammunition, but there was little military
advantage in using them against soldiers. It was hard to justify gruesome
pictures of targeted soldiers to a concerned public.177 Obviously, it was pos-
sible simply to order the troops to use such bullets against nonhuman
targets only, but governments did not trust low-ranking soldiers.178 At the
same time, they felt that they could trust commanders of artillery units to
use properly the projectiles. Hence, the declaration prohibits only projectiles
weighing less than 400 grams, namely, those that could be loaded into rifles.
Poisoning can be an effective way to incapacitate an enemy combatant.
Nonetheless, it was prohibited by IHL even before the Brussels Declaration
of 1874.179 At the time it was prohibited, the use of poison was perceived as
dishonorable.180 Immanuel Kant sheds light on the matter, suggesting that
nations at war must refrain from “such acts of war as shall make mutual
trust impossible during some future time of peace” and specifically referring
to poisoning as one of the “dishonorable stratagems” that must be “abso-
lutely prohibited.”181 In other words, beyond moral condemnation of such a
method of warfare, the more realist concern was the potentially long-term
reputational effects of using such weapons. Poison was readily available to
soldiers, and its use would not always be apparent to commanders. Soldiers
might have been tempted to use poison to avoid confrontation or otherwise
reduce their risks of injury or death. The prohibition on the use of poison
therefore resolved a potential tension between governments and their
soldiers. In our terminology, principals who were worried about the long-
term implications of using poison sought to secure their military agents’
compliance through a clear IHL prohibition.
176. St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 79.
177. On the communication revolution of the time, see supra text accompanying notes
104–105.
178. See Protocols of the Military Conference at St. Petersburg, supra note 126. The proto-
cols reflect a debate dominated by the powerful European states in which the relatively weaker
state representatives rarely ventured to intervene.
179. Declaration of Brussels, supra note 80, art. 13(a).
180. 3 Alexander Gillespie, A History of the Laws of War 88–90 (2011).
181. Immanuel Kant, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795), reprinted in Per-
petual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals 107, 109–10 (Ted
Humphrey trans., 1983).
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5. The Law of Occupation
The goal of controlling the military agent resonates in many, if not
most, nineteenth-century norms governing the occupation of enemy terri-
tory. As Napoleon discovered in Spain, occupation poses complex govern-
ance challenges for the occupying forces. Not only do such forces need to
control an adversarial population, but they must also make sure their own
forces do not treat the communities under their control too harshly. The
need for international law to govern occupation and minimize what we call
agency costs was felt by the U.S. General Scott in the U.S.–Mexican War in
1848, by Lincoln in 1863, and by the Prussian Army in occupied France in
1870.182 The law of occupation that developed during the nineteenth century
is tailored to these very ends: it sets forth what an occupier is and is not
permitted to do, regulating the treatment of locals who dare to challenge the
occupier and thereby providing tools for the local population and third par-
ties to assess compliance with these restraints.183
For example, whereas individual soldiers are prohibited from pillaging
and destroying property,184 the organized exploitation of private property is
approved and regulated. The regime of organized exploitation of private
property reflects not morality but the evolving needs of the army of occupa-
tion. The Brussels Declaration of 1874 permitted occupying armies to rely
heavily on the occupied population’s resources to sustain the war effort.
When requisitioning private property, the occupant was expected to issue a
receipt to enable dispossessed owners to claim a refund from their own gov-
ernment (at the time, the defeated government was expected to compensate
the victor).185 With the modernization of military logistics in the late nine-
teenth century allowing armies to rely more heavily on their own resources,
nations agreed (in the 1899 Hague Regulations) to stipulate that the occu-
pier would pay compensation “as far as possible” instead of issuing re-
ceipts.186 Only in the 1907 Regulations did actual reimbursement become the
norm.187 The deliberations during the respective conferences on the limits of
requisitioning reflect the strong interest of the potential occupying forces in
182. See Witt, supra note 4, at 123–24 (discussing Scott’s use of international law to
resolve governance problems); see also supra note 114; infra text accompanying notes 215–216.
183. Benvenisti, supra note 8, at 70–71.
184. 1899 Hague Convention, supra note 70, art. 47.
185. Declaration of Brussels, supra note 80, arts. 41, 42 (“For every contribution, a receipt
shall be given to the person furnishing it.”).
186. The 1899 Hague Regulations introduced actual payment of compensation as the pri-
mary substitute. 1899 Hague Convention, supra note 70, art. 52 (“The contributions in kind
shall, as far as possible, be paid for in ready money; if not, their receipt shall be
acknowledged.”)
187. The 1907 version made sure actual compensation was the occupant’s obligation.
1907 Hague Convention, supra note 70, art. 52. (“Contributions in kind shall as far is [sic]
possible be paid for in cash; if not, a receipt shall be given and the payment of the amount due
shall be made as soon as possible”).
June 2014] Explaining Laws of War from a Principal–Agent Perspective 1405
norms that would facilitate their military rule without regard to morality or
reciprocity.
Another key example is the norms that define the occupier’s authority
to modify existing legislation. Occupiers were expected to maintain the insti-
tutional status quo and abide by existing legislation “unless absolutely pre-
vented.”188 This regime resolves three problems of governance. First, it
reduces the discretion of occupying forces and ensures consistency in the
way they treat the various areas under their control, thereby increasing the
ability of their principal to control its agents’ actions.189 Second, the norms
assigning authority to the occupier seek to regularize life under occupation.
Third, maintaining the status quo resolves a P–A problem for the ousted
government, which may be worried that local elements will exploit the op-
portunity to seize power or otherwise make its resumption of authority diffi-
cult. In this latter sense, Article 43 of the Hague Regulations constituted a
pact between state elites that had nothing to do with morality or reciproc-
ity.190 As with the other IHL norms that received detailed attention during
the formative stage of codification in the second half of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the law of occupation had little to do with protecting civilians or mini-
mizing harm to combatants. It was all about controlling the military agents.
B. Institutions
IHL’s fire-alarm mechanism has been considerably enhanced through
the establishment of mechanisms that communicate information between
the governments engaged in hostilities. The following material outlines the
traditional institutions that developed in an era of interstate warfare. All of
them reduce information gaps within the army. Additional institutions de-
veloped in recent years to address asymmetric warfare, and they will be dis-
cussed in Part IV.
1. Information-Generating Institutions
The first of such institutions is the “protecting power.” A protecting
power is a neutral state that has agreed to look after the interests of another
state engaged in hostilities with a third state.191 One of the protecting
power’s key tasks is to facilitate the exchange of information from the state it
represents (and its population under occupation, to which it has the right of
access192) to the government of the opposite side. This information is not
188. 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 70, art. 43.
189. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
190. Benvenisti, supra note 8, at 70–71.
191. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 9,
Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, available at http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?
action=openDocument&documentId=AE2D398352C5B028C12563CD002D6B5C.
192. Id.; see also Benvenisti, supra note 8, at 341; Hans-Joachim Heintze, Protecting
Power, in 8 The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 545 (Ru¨diger
Wolfrum ed., 2012).
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disseminated publicly. The opposite side’s government can therefore rely on
the protecting power to provide information from the battlefield or occu-
pied territory that its own army may be hesitant to reveal.
The ICRC is the most effective information-generating institution. The
ICRC’s access to hostility zones and occupied areas, which is secured by
IHL,193 enables it to obtain information about the behavior of combatants
and occupiers. Over the ICRC’s many years in existence, it has developed a
strategy for communicating this information in the most effective way. In a
2005 document, the ICRC explained this strategy, stressing that its principal
mode of operation is “bilateral and confidential representations.”194 Its pri-
mary role is to communicate information about violations to the fighting
party itself, obviously under the assumption that such violations betray a
lack of discipline within the army rather than an intention to breach the
law.195 Only if the state does not respond to the communication will the
ICRC start mobilizing other states or regional organizations to persuade the
violator to observe the law.196 These contacts are also confidential and ex-
tend only to states that provide assurances that they will honor the confiden-
tiality of the communications.197 It is only when these two methods fail that
the ICRC might turn to public condemnation.198 In his comprehensive anal-
ysis, Professor Ratner posits secrecy and confidentiality as the core modality
of the ICRC’s operations.199
The secretive mode of operation of both protecting powers and the
ICRC fits nicely with our P–A analysis. The information they communicate
enables a government to overcome information gaps and thereby constrain
its army’s autonomy. That the information remains private allows a govern-
ment to conceal what it wants from the general public and thereby avert
criticism for its inability to rein in the military.
2. “Military Necessity”
As Professor Luban recently clarified, the entrenched doctrine of mili-
tary necessity has been accorded several interpretations.200 Initially, some
states (notably Germany) regarded the necessities of war (Kriegsraison) as
enjoying precedence over the rules of war. IHL, therefore, applied only until
193. Id. art. 11.
194. Action by the International Committee of the Red Cross in the Event of Violations of
International Humanitarian Law or Other Fundamental Rules Protecting Persons in Situations of
Violence, 87 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 393, 395 (2005).
195. See id.
196. Id. at 396.
197. See id. at 396–97.
198. Id. at 398.
199. Steven R. Ratner, Law Promotion Beyond Law Talk: The Red Cross, Persuasion, and the
Laws of War, 22 Eur. J. Int’l L. 459, 472 (2011).
200. Luban, supra note 3, at 322–36.
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it became too dangerous to be complied with.201 This extreme view was later
rejected in favor of a meaning that endorses “military necessity” as part of
the law.202 In Luban’s words, according to this second meaning, whereas IHL
“governs . . . war everywhere, by decreeing which rules will bend to military
necessity and which will not,” it “remains overwhelmingly slanted in favour
of militaries, and grants them enormous latitude.”203 As Professor Dinstein
emphasizes, in assessing the exercise of discretion in ex post proceedings, the
“appraisal of the circumstances . . . must be based on the combat situation
as it appeared to the commander at the time of action.”204
This “enormous latitude,” to be reviewed ex post and taking into ac-
count the information that the commander had at the time of action, pro-
vides a useful escape clause for agents (governments and commanders alike)
who wish to avoid responsibility. But the principals are the main benefi-
ciaries of this “optimally imperfect” doctrine.205 They are the ones who en-
joy enormous latitude in deciding how to react to information they receive
about their agents’ breaches of the law. The doctrine also shields them to
some extent from having sanctions imposed on them or their agents by third
parties. If the main goal of IHL is to deter the agent without restricting the
principal’s options too severely, the traditional doctrine on military neces-
sity is eminently suitable for the purpose.
Indirectly, the doctrine on military necessity creates an incentive for ar-
mies to collect information and keep records so that their discretion does
not betray recklessness toward compliance with IHL.206 By forcing military
commanders to gather as much information as possible regarding a specific
incident, to record this information, and to make it available to the civilian
authorities, the doctrine seeks to close the information gap and thereby re-
duce agency slack.207
201. See Yoram Dinstein, Military Necessity, in 3 The Max Planck Encyclopedia of
Public International Law 274 (Ru¨diger Wolfrum ed., 2012); cf. Carnahan, supra note 98,
at 217–18 (referring to the Lieber Code’s definition of military necessity as “a license for
mischief”).
202. For example, the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks refers to attacks “which
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Pro-
tocol I), supra note 157, art. 51(5)(B).
203. Luban, supra note 3, at 342.
204. Dinstein, supra note 201.
205. On the optimally imperfect nature of IHL, see supra text accompanying notes 26–27.
206. See Gregory S. McNeal, Targeted Killing and Accountability, 102 Geo. L.J. 681 (2014)
(explaining the procedure used by U.S. armed forces in Afghanistan to limit collateral damage
during targeted killings operations).
207. For a procedural interpretation of the norm of proportionality, see Amichai Cohen,
The Principle of Proportionality in the Context of Operation Cast Lead: Institutional Perspectives,
35 Rutgers L. Rec. 23 (2009).
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3. Reprisals
The doctrine of reprisal states that when one party to a conflict violates
an IHL norm, the other party is allowed to respond in kind, subject to cer-
tain conditions.208 In recent decades, the doctrine has fallen out of favor, and
most commentators consider its use to be allowed only under very narrow
circumstances.209 Reprisals are usually described as an embodiment of the
reciprocal nature of IHL, and their demise is attributed to the rise of moral-
ity in IHL. Neither of these explanations is entirely convincing. It has always
been problematic to justify reprisals with moral arguments.210 And although
it is possible that the voice of morality has become louder in recent years,
the need to find an answer to asymmetric conflicts has become more acute
where nonstate actors systematically flout IHL. Indeed, if the reason for the
doctrine is the reciprocal nature of IHL, we would have expected it to thrive
under contemporary conditions when most wars are asymmetric and when
regular armies are sorely tempted to react harshly to their opponents’ viola-
tions. But regular armies rarely invoke reprisals as a justification for their
reactions.
The doctrine of reprisal, we submit, is specifically designed to respond
to P–A problems because of the procedures it sets forth: it allows retaliation
only after an advance warning has been communicated to the enemy (that is,
a fire-alarm mechanism) and only after retaliation has been approved by the
highest echelons of the retaliating army.211 As a result, P–A costs are mini-
mized on both sides. That reprisals are governed by international norms also
enables both the government and the army to deflect pressure from their
respective principals (citizens and government) to respond too aggressively
against an opponent. We find such reliance on the law already during the
U.S. Civil War, where Halleck, in his role as general in chief, invoked the
limits on reprisals to rebuff public calls for harsher retaliation measures
against the Confederates.212
208. Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of Interna-
tional Armed Conflict 253–55 (2d ed. 2010).
209. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), supra note 157, art.
51(6); Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 24, at 513–18.
210. Professor Walzer argues that there is some moral justification for reprisals against
soldiers but not against civilians. Walzer, supra note 1, at 215. It is not clear, however, why
reprisals were common practice in the nineteenth century and what exactly brought about the
demise of the phenomenon in the twentieth century.
211. For the “conditions for reprisal action,” see Ministry of Defence, Joint Service
Publication 383, The Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict 421 (2004)
(U.K.), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/27874/JSP3832004Edition.pdf (“Reasonable notice must be given that reprisals will be
taken . . . . It must be publicized. . . . [It] must only be authorized at the highest level of
government.”); see also Christopher Greenwood, Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law, in
The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law 201, 233 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed.
2008) (“[R]eprisals shall be authorized by the highest political level.”).
212. Best, supra note 4, at 169.
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At the same time, the right to resort to reprisal offers a convenient es-
cape clause for governments that seek to deviate from the rules by citing the
opponent’s violations. In this way, the doctrine also contributes to the opti-
mal imperfection of IHL.
In asymmetric warfare conducted by and against nonstate actors, acts of
reprisal against the nonstate actor, which in fact harm civilians, have little
informational value because they are unlikely to reduce the information gap
within the enemy army. The principals of the nonstate power have no
qualms about flouting IHL. Nor will the nonstate enemy resort to the pro-
cess of reprisals to warn its regular opponent of violations by its fighters. We
submit that the ineffectiveness of reprisals as a means of communication
probably explains their falling out of favor.213
IV. Asymmetric Warfare and Principal–Agent Relations: What
Role for IHL?
Asymmetric warfare poses acute governance challenges. Frustration
with the inability to identify defined military targets and achieve clear “vic-
tory” against an enemy that abuses the law’s protection often leads both
principals and agents to break the law. Some principals realize sooner or
later that such deterioration may be counterproductive, and they may adopt
what has recently been called counterinsurgency strategies.214 As we suggest
in this Part, IHL can assist the principals in promoting this policy. At the
same time, other principals fail to appreciate this concern out of the hope
that extreme measures will break their opponents’ backs. In these latter
cases, while principals have little need for IHL, other forces—foreign states
and global public opinion—resort to IHL for a variety of moral and utilita-
rian reasons. These actors hope to deter both principals and agents through
external enforcement measures that are based on IHL, such as war crime
adjudication. Through such indirect enforcement of IHL, third parties seek
to strengthen agents’ resolve to defy manifestly unlawful orders issued by
their principals.
The first reported use of international law as part of a counterin-
surgency operation took place during the U.S.–Mexican War in 1847 when
General Scott issued General Order No. 20.215 The order authorized him to
213. It is not clear whether all reprisals against citizens are always prohibited. Article 51(6)
of Additional Protocol I indeed prohibits such acts, but it is arguable whether it is customary,
that is, obligatory, on states that did not join the first additional protocol (e.g., the United
States and Israel) or that attached a specific reservation to this article (e.g., the United King-
dom). See Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 24, at 514. It is almost unthinkable,
however, that any state would actually use reprisals against civilians in the modern world.
214. E.g., U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency (2006),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf.
215. David Glazier, Precedents Lost: The Neglected History of the Military Commission, 46
Va. J. Int’l L. 5, 31–33 (2005); Erika Myers, Conquering Peace: Military Commissions as a
Lawfare Strategy in the Mexican War, 35 Am. J. Crim. L. 201, 205, 215–16 (2008); see also
Witt, supra note 4, at 123–24.
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try both American soldiers and Mexican fighters for violating his instruc-
tions in military commissions. The success of Scott’s law-based strategy in
effectively reducing strife in the area under his control can be compared to
the experience of another general in another area who faced severe chal-
lenges to his authority until he adopted Scott’s methods.216
The U.S. troops’ massacre in the village of My Lai in 1968 served as the
impetus for the U.S. Army’s strict adoption of IHL.217 Canada followed suit
after Canadian forces were involved in atrocities during the short-term occu-
pation of Somalia in 1992.218 What is common to these measures is the
adoption of institutions that provide a credible threat to military agents
based on domestic institutions (rather than on external actors). Since the
available external threats are limited for armies as strong as the U.S. military,
the leadership must develop effective internal constraints. These constraints
are also optimally imperfect because they offer the principals at least some
opportunities to forgo sanctions when they do not need the cover of IHL.
Reliance on internal institutions and procedures to ensure compliance with
IHL is therefore the optimal solution for government and military agents
engaged in asymmetric warfare. Here we mention rather briefly three of
these enforcement institutions.
A. Operational Legal Advisers
Since the Gulf War in 1991, the presence of legal advisers embedded in
front units and involved in operational decisions has become routine in the
U.S., British, NATO, and Israeli armed forces.219 Legal operational advice
constitutes the most important internal monitoring device available to the
government and the army’s high command in controlling the behavior of
216. Myers, supra note 215, at 226.
217. The Peers Report that investigated the events leading up to the My Lai Massacre in
Vietnam cited the lack of proper training in the law of war as one of the factors that created an
environment conducive to violations. See Stephen A. Myrow, Waging War on the Advice of
Counsel: The Role of Operational Law in the Gulf War, 7 U.S. A.F. Acad. J. Legal Stud. 131,
133 (1996–1997); see also Major Jeffrey F. Addicott & Major William A. Hudson, Jr., The
Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of My Lai: A Time to Inculcate the Lessons, 139 Mil. L. Rev. 153,
162–64 (1993) (discussing the findings of the Peers Report concerning lack of training in the
law).
218. Following the recommendations of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry Report, see
Colonel Kenneth W. Watkin, The Operational Lawyer: An Essential Resource for the Modern
Commander (manuscript at 12–15) (on file with authors).
219. During the Gulf War in 1991, officers of the U.S. Judge Advocate General Corps
constantly monitored and reviewed the selection of targets in the coalition’s air campaign. See
Michael W. Lewis, The Law of Aerial Bombardment in the 1991 Gulf War, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 481
(2003); see also U.S. Dep’t of Def., Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian
Gulf War, Appendix O: The Role of the Law of War, 31 I.L.M. 615, 617 (1992). During
the NATO attack on Serbia in 1999, lawyers examined every sortie, Michael F. Lohr & Steve
Gallotta, Legal Support in War: The Role of the Military Lawyer, 4 Chi. J. Int’l L. 465, 476
(2003), and during the invasion of Iraq in 2003, American and British legal advisers accompa-
nied the ground forces, Laura A. Dickinson, Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An Empirical
Account of International Law Compliance, 104 Am. J. Int’l. L. 1 (2010).
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the armed forces. Operational legal advisers are not only required to approve
activities but also to inculcate the relevant legal norms and incorporate in-
ternational law into military practice. Observing the emergence of legal op-
erational advice in the IDF, one of this Article’s authors points out that
“[t]he presence of operational legal advisers has enabled the military to ‘in-
ternalize’ IHL, with all that the term implies with respect to the assimilation
of that body of law into the modus operandi of the armed forces them-
selves.”220 Thanks to them, “IHL has been transformed from an ‘external’
constraint on military action to an intrinsic facet of the military’s own oper-
ational code.”221
And yet there is no obligation under international law to embed opera-
tional legal advisers with the troops or have them approve individual mis-
sions. The only obligation is to “ensure that legal advisers are available, when
necessary, to advise military commanders at the appropriate level” on IHL.222
Nevertheless, as indicated above, after having experienced serious agency
costs relating to violations of the law by their subordinates, several armies
have voluntarily adopted even more stringent legal review than IHL actually
demands.223
B. Domestic Review by Independent Actors
In many liberal democracies, domestic institutions responsible for inves-
tigating violations of IHL have undergone major reforms in recent years.
Courts have started to exercise review over security measures and even over
military practices;224 commissions of inquiry have sprouted up in many ju-
risdictions; and an IHL-based obligation to review and investigate possible
violations of IHL by independent agents has crystallized.225 In other words,
220. Amichai Cohen, Legal Operational Advice in the Israeli Defense Forces: The Interna-
tional Law Department and the Changing Nature of International Humanitarian Law, 26 Conn.
J. Int’l Law 367, 389 (2011).
221. Id.; see also Dickinson, supra note 219; Galia Rivlin, Constitutions Beyond Borders:
The Overlooked Practical Aspects of the Extraterritorial Question, 30 B.U. Int’l L.J. 135 (2012)
(interviewing Israeli military officials, state attorneys, and judges concerning Israeli policies in
the Occupied Territories).
222. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), supra note 157, art. 82
(emphasis added). Article 82 of the Additional Protocol declares the following:
The High Contracting Parties at all times, and the Parties to the conflict in time of armed
conflict, shall ensure that legal advisers are available, when necessary, to advise military
commanders at the appropriate level on the application of the Conventions and this
Protocol and on the appropriate instruction to be given to the armed forces on this
subject.
Id.
223. On the evolution of operational legal advice, see Dickinson, supra note 219.
224. Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International
Law by National Courts, 102 Am. J. Int’l L. 241 (2008).
225. E.g., The Comm’n of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut,
Final Report, in The Beirut Massacre: The Complete Kahan Commission Report
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domestic actors that are institutionally distinct from the echelons of military
authority have become more involved with the monitoring and possible dis-
ciplining of military actions. The need to reduce agency costs provides a
partial explanation of these developments.
C. The Rise of International Criminal Law
What motivated the rise of international criminal law (“ICL”) was third
parties’ realization that the principals were no longer reliable. The rise of
genocidal regimes made it necessary to deter the principals and the agents
that obey their orders. ICL constitutes a reminder to the military agents of
their obligation to disobey their principals if they are given illegal com-
mands.226 Obviously, ICL can also be a way for governments to pre-commit
themselves and their troops.227 Furthermore, the principle of “complemen-
tarity,”228 according to which states may avoid prosecution abroad if they
themselves make genuine efforts to prosecute violators, provides an incen-
tive to strengthen domestic reviewing institutions that can enforce domestic
compliance with IHL.
V. Normative Implications
In this Article, we have focused on what we suggest has been a main
function of IHL: providing a system of norms designed to regulate the
agency gaps in the governance of warfare. Before concluding, we would like
to reflect briefly on the potential normative ramifications of this analysis.
Our main observation is that IHL does not necessarily reflect its draft-
ers’ intention to promote morality in warfare and to protect civilians and
(Karz-Cohl Publ’g, Inc. 1983) (Isr.); The Bloody Sunday Inquiry, Report, 2010–11 H.C.
29-1 (U.K.), available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20101103103903/http://
bloody-sunday-inquiry.org; About the Inquiry, Iraq Inquiry, available at http://www.
iraqinquiry.org.uk/about.aspx (last visited Feb. 12, 2014); Neth. Inst. for War Documenta-
tion, Srebrenica, a ‘Safe’ Area: Reconstruction, Background, Consequences and
Analyses of the Fall of a Safe Area, http://www.niod.knaw.nl/en/srebrenica-report/report
(last visited Feb. 12, 2014). For a description of these reforms and their implications, see
Amichai Cohen & Yuval Shany, Beyond the Grave Breaches Regime: The Duty to Investigate
Alleged Violations of International Law Governing Armed Conflicts, 14 Y.B. Int’l Humanita-
rian L. 37 (2011); Michael N. Schmitt, Investigating Violations of International Law in Armed
Conflict, 2 Harv. Nat’l Security J. 31 (2011).
226. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9* (July
17, 1998). See generally Bohrer, supra note 31 (describing the inherent conflict of interest
between the principals and the military).
227. Beth A. Simmons & Allison Danner, Credible Commitments and the International
Criminal Court, 64 Int’l Org. 225, 234 (2010) (claiming that governments tied their hands by
joining the ICC in order to create credible commitments to their domestic constituencies).
228. The principle of complementarity appears in article 17 of the ICC Rome Statute.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 226. According to this principle,
the court would only act if the relevant state is “unwilling or unable” to investigate the crime.
Id.
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combatants as much as possible against the scourge of war. Indeed, govern-
ments and armies have often tried, and sometimes succeeded in, convincing
their citizens and global public opinion that the sole purpose of the law they
have drafted and complied with is to promote a common morality. This
public relations campaign began in 1868 with the first solemn declaration to
the effect that war was meant solely to weaken, not kill, the enemy.229 It has
continued ever since. Our analysis demonstrates that although IHL has pro-
moted moral concerns, these concerns came as an afterthought, when they
comported with the interest of maintaining control throughout the echelons
of authority.
As a tool for regulating P–A relations, IHL is indirectly protective of
civilians’ interests and partially promotes morality in warfare. IHL directs
governments or armies not to harm citizens excessively or expose their fam-
ily members serving in the army to unnecessary suffering and death without
the opportunity to surrender. As we saw above, the evidence suggests that
low-level soldiers perpetrate most violations, and better controls could elim-
inate much harm.230 Even when IHL’s function is reducing agency costs, it
can indirectly contribute to mitigating human suffering because it seeks to
restrain soldiers who might lose their tempers at the height of battle.
But IHL responds to citizens’ goals only partially (and indirectly) be-
cause the IHL-making process itself is also subject to the P–A problem.
Agents of the citizens (governments and armies) usually dominate interna-
tional bargaining over treaty drafting, while civil society has had considera-
ble difficulty expressing its views.231 Civil society has encountered difficulties
in repeating the unique success of Dunant and his colleagues in 1864, after
which governments and armies took the lead in regulating warfare.232 In
recent years, only a handful of civil society initiatives—for example, prohibi-
tions on the use of certain types of weapons and ammunition, such as anti-
personnel mines233 and cluster bombs234—matured into treaties. The Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court was also achieved through heavy
civil society involvement,235 but the criminal law’s emphasis on strict actus
reus and mens rea requirements leave out violations of IHL that do not
amount to war crimes. It is therefore not surprising that the IHL to which
governments and armies subscribe—and which is reflected in ICL—grants
priority to military necessity over humanitarian concerns.236 Their version of
229. St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 79.
230. See Morrow, supra note 20, at 569–70.
231. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
232. Supra notes 119–121 and accompanying text.
233. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211.
234. Convention on Cluster Munitions, May 30, 2008, 48 I.L.M. 357.
235. Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 93
Am. J. Int’l L. 22 (1999).
236. Luban, supra note 3.
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the law is less than perfectly aligned with limited human suffering, as naked
state interests often overshadow humanitarian concerns.
Our observation about the function of IHL therefore suggests that the
law does not fully reflect the interests of all stakeholders, as the more diffuse
citizenry has not had ample opportunity to weigh in on the drafting process
of the law or its implementation. Our story adds weight to Luban’s call for
the “civilianization of the laws of war”237 and supports the lawmaking func-
tion of international courts, which Theodor Meron has characterized as “the
humanization of humanitarian law.”238 Our analysis authorizes, indeed re-
quires, the judicious interpreter—a domestic or international judge applying
IHL—to adopt a critical attitude toward the law and to take into account the
interests of the underrepresented principals in the process of construing it.239
Conclusion
Many factors may explain the emergence of IHL: the influence of philo-
sophical ideas, the self-interest of armies, or the heroic role played by social
activists. All of these explanations have their merits, which we do not chal-
lenge. Rather, our goal in this Article has been to highlight an alternative
explanation of the rationale for IHL, its evolution, and the shape of key IHL
norms. Our approach resolves certain puzzles—such as why strong powers
have an interest in IHL, why there is a difference between the laws of war on
land and at sea, and why IHL is still viable in asymmetrical armed con-
flicts—because it addresses a crucial aspect that all other accounts have
failed to discern: the grave challenge that governments face when their ar-
mies engage in battle and their concomitant need to ensure their control
over them.
Due to the limited space and general claim of the Article, we have been
able to provide only a bird’s-eye view of IHL’s evolution. We believe, how-
ever, that our account is sufficiently robust to support the contention that
the evolution of IHL is a story of principals seeking ways to enhance their
domination over their military agents and negotiating the contours of the
law not only with foreign governments but also with their own armies. Our
summary account leaves space for a much-needed, more elaborate historical
examination of the motivations of the different actors who contributed to
IHL’s evolution. We believe that attention to the P–A dimension of warfare
237. Id. at 338–39.
238. Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 Am. J. Int’l L. 239
(2000).
239. For a domestic analogy to this method of interpretation, see, for example, William S.
Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479 (1987); William N. Es-
kridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Inter-
pretation, 74 Va. L. Rev. 275 (1988); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes,
50 Duke L.J. 1215 (2001); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Comment, Structuring
Lawmaking to Reduce Cognitive Bias: A Critical View, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 616 (2002); William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword, Law as Equilibrium, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 26
(1994).
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and the need to regulate it will provide more data that will further bolster
our general claim.
By many accounts, IHL is presented as imposing restrictions on states
engaged in combat. A state fighting an asymmetric war is regarded as having
to “fight with one hand tied behind its back.”240 But if our analysis is correct,
the opposite is often true: as a practical matter, IHL enhances the ability of
states to amass huge armies because it lowers the costs of controlling them.
It thus renders the decision to go to war less risky than it would be other-
wise.241 Therefore, although at times compliance with the law may prove
costly in the short run, in the long run states with massive armies are the
greatest beneficiaries.
240. HCJ 5100/94 The Public Committee Against Torture v. Israel 53(4) PD 1, 36–37
[1999] (Isr.).
241. A similar argument is raised with respect to the law of occupation, viewed as “a pact
between state elites, promising reciprocal guarantees of political continuity, and thus, at least
to a certain extent, rendering the decision to resort to arms less profound.” Benvenisti, supra
note 8, at 71.
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